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I. INTRODUCTION
The fiduciary duty of care does not seem to get very much respect. Most people would
acknowledge the importance of the duty of loyalty, 1 but the same is not true of the duty of
care. Historically, the corporate law duty of care has been underenforced at best, and
arguably unenforced entirely. When it seemed that the courts might finally breathe life into
the duty, legislatures responded quickly to prevent that from happening. Some scholars do
not consider the duty of care to be a fiduciary duty at all, and there are those who would
do away with it entirely. It seems that the duty of care does not have many defenders these
2
days.
In this Article, I intend to provide a comprehensive defense of the fiduciary duty of
care in corporate law. I hope to show that the duty of care is not simply an ill-fitting
appendage to the duty of loyalty, but rather an essential aspect of the singular fiduciary
concept that also encompasses the duty of loyalty. Simply put, a fiduciary has the duty to
act in the interests of the beneficiary in all relevant respects. Once the breadth of this
singular fiduciary concept is properly understood, it is revealed to be much more than any
of the individual duties that it comprises. Far from being streamlined or focused, fiduciary
law would be impoverished if it were limited to the duty of loyalty. Thus, the duty of care
should not be eliminated from the ranks of fiduciary duties.
However, I do not intend to argue for a more robust duty of care. Rather, I will defend
the duty of care, as it currently exists in corporate law (more or less) 3-deliberately and
advisedly underenforced, but not entirely unenforced. 4 There are many benefits that flow
from the duty of care, but also many costs. A policy of reduced enforcement can
significantly mitigate many of those costs, while retaining most of the benefits. In other
words, the duty of care works in the corporate context precisely because caution is built

I. In this paper, I will use the term "duty of loyalty" to refer to traditionalloyalty, focusing on conflicts
of interest and self-dealing. See infra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between "the
duty of loyalty (as traditionally defined)" and its newer, broader sense).
2. Of course, there are some exceptions, the most notable of which is Professor Lyman Johnson. He has
written extensively on the duty of care. See, e g., Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of DirectorCare,
24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 789 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Rethinking]; Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business
Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625 (1999-2000); Lyman Johnson, CorporateOfficers and the Business Judgment
Rule, 60 Bus. LAW. 439 (2005); Lyman Johnson, Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011);
Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38
DEL. J. CORP. L 405, 412 (2013). See also Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care- Judicial
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983);
Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest ProposalforFixing Delaware'sBroken Duty of Care, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
319 (2010). While Johnson and others may argue for a more robust duty of care, I do not. See infra note 3 and
accompanying text.
3. In my opinion, it would be ideal to have a robust business judgment rule without the option for
exculpation. Optional exculpation provisions are not necessarily problematic. However, they should be easier to
adopt and repeal-perhaps by shareholder-adopted bylaw rather than by charter amendment (which also requires
the approval of directors).
4. 1 use the terms "underenforced" and "underenforcement" deliberately I do not mean less enforcement
than is normatively desirable. Rather, I mean enforcing a lower legal standard than that which is normatively
desirable. However, as will be made clear, the enforcement of a lower legal standard is intended to lead to the
normatively desirable behavior-consistent with the correct legal standard. See infra notes 35-41, 105-111 and
accompanying text. See also Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 519, 550-51 (2012).
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into the enforcement equation.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II will consider various arguments against
the duty of care. These arguments can be grouped into several categories: that there really
is no such duty because it is unenforced; that the duty is undesirable for practical reasons;
that the duty is unnecessary because of other forces; and that the duty of care is not a
fiduciary duty. The arguments have varying degrees of merit, and each will be considered
in turn. One theme will recur: whatever merit the argument may have when considered
against a robust duty of care is severely diminished when considered against the existing,
underenforced duty. In other words, most arguments against the duty of care are logically
only arguments for reduced enforcement of the duty of care. They do not establish that
non-enforcement or elimination of the duty of care would be ideal.
Part III will consider various arguments in favor of the duty of care. I start by showing
that the duty of care is a well-established fiduciary duty and then address its deterrence
value. Next, I argue that the duty of care is necessary because of the duty of loyalty's
shortcomings: first, that it is also underenforced and therefore unable to police fiduciary
relationships on its own, and second, that the concept of loyalty is inadequate to capture
the essence of the fiduciary principle. Finally, I discuss the expressive value of law: the
duty of care is necessary to let fiduciaries know that they have a legal duty to pursue the
beneficiaries' interests with skill and diligence (i.e., carefully), and not merely to avoid
conflicts of interest (i.e., loyally).
I close with a discussion of why the issue matters. I explain that the fiduciary principle
is necessarily broad and expansive and cannot be boiled down to a few simple rules. I then
argue that the urge to simplify the law of fiduciary duties by eliminating the duty of care
from its ranks is misguided. Finally, I suggest that, in the long run, the courts will tend to
resist the reductionist impulse to simplify at the expense of equity. Thus, it is better to
accept the duty of care and deal with it directly than to attempt to eliminate it and invite
judicial innovation.

II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST
This part will consider the case against the duty of care. The main arguments fall into
four categories, and each will be considered in turn. Section A will consider the argument
that there really is no duty of care because it is unenforced. Section B will consider the
argument that the duty of care is undesirable for practical reasons. Section C will consider
the argument that the duty of care is unnecessary because of other forces that lead to
adequate care. Section D will consider the argument that, whatever it may be, the duty of
care is not a fiduciary duty.
A. Unenforced
Perhaps the most obvious argument against the duty of care, at least in corporate law,
is that effectively there is no such duty. Empirically, there are very few cases where liability
has been premised on a breach of the duty of care. Doctrinally, the business judgment rule
shields directors from liability in all but the most extreme cases. Moreover, corporations
have the option to shield directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care by
including exculpation provisions in their charters. It would seem that there is very little, if
any, bite left in the duty of care. If that is the case, then perhaps the duty of care should be
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explicitly retired once and for all. 5 These arguments are not without merit, but careful
consideration can reveal their limits.
1. EmpiricalResponse

The most straightforward argument against the duty of care is that it is meaningless
because it is virtually unenforced: there are very few cases in which directors have been6
held personally liable for monetary damages in cases involving solely a duty of care claim.
As Professor Joseph Bishop once put it, "[t]he search for cases in which directors of
industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence

uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack." 7 The dearth of cases resulting in liability for breach of the duty of care is
undeniably relevant, but may not be as damning as it seems. There are circumstances that
put the raw numbers into perspective.
Although the cases are few and far between, they are not non-existent. By comparison,
cases leading to director liability based solely on the quality of substantive business
decisions are truly rare. Although courts often reserve the right to find liability based upon
irrational decisions, 8 they rarely do so in fact. Because of this, waste might be fairly
described as more theoretical than real. 9 The same is not quite true of procedural care. A
leading treatise identifies about a dozen cases that led to director liability for breach of the
duty of care. 10 Admittedly, this is not a very large number, but it is not zero. Moreover, the

5. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project,35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1983) ("In short, very little if any value would be lost by outright abolition
of the legal duty of care and its accompanying threat of a lawsuit.").
6. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Duck- New Trends in the Identification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1100 (1968) (noting four examples "based on
extensive (although not exhaustive) investigation"); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care.
JudicialAvoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591
& n.1(1983) (finding seven cases). See also 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE'
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 167-73 (1998) (discussing twelve cases).
7. Bishop, supranote 6, at 1099.
8. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263-64 (Del. 2000); David Rosenberg, GalacticStupidity
and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L 301, 304 (2007) ("Although few courts or commentators are
willing to use the term, substantive due care analysis is in fact alive in Delaware fiduciary law, and has been for
at least two decades."); William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment. and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J
CORP. L. 465, 492 (1985) ("[Tlhere can be no question that for years the courts have in fact reviewed directors'
business decisions to some extent from a quality ofjudgment point of view. Businessmen do not like it, but courts
do it and are likely to continue to do it because directors are fiduciaries."). Compare In re Caremark Int'l, Inc.
Denv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch 1996) ("Compliance with a director's duty of care can never
appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the boarddecision that leads to a corporate
(emphasis in original).
loss[.]")
9. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that the theoretical
exception for "egregious" decisions has never resulted in a money judgment against a director).
10. See I BLOCK ET AL., supranote 6, at 167-72. Many of the cases involve financial institutions, such as
banks, which may have the need for a heightened duty of care See generallyChristopher M. Bruner, Conceptions
of CorporatePurpose in Post-CrisisFinancialFirms, 36 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 527, 538-40 (2013) (describing
cases in which directors were held liable); Patricia A. McCoy, A Political Economy of the Business Judgment
Rule in Banking: ImplicationsforCorporateLaw, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,3 (1996) (describing the curtailing
of the business judgment rule in response to lending practices that triggered bank runs). However, not all cases
involve financial institutions. Moreover, that fact does not seem especially relevant in some of the cases that do.
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number must be considered in the context of the corporate legal landscape.
The lack of cases can readily be explained by the divergence between standards of
conduct and standards of review in corporate law.11 Standards of conduct are rules
addressed to actors, specifying expectations regarding their behavior, while standards of
review are rules addressed to courts, specifying how actions are to be judged. In most areas
of law, standards of conduct and review converge. For example, in tort law, the standard
of conduct is ordinary care, and the standard of review is negligence. The same is not true
in corporate law, where standards of conduct and standards of review diverge. This
divergence is most evident in the business judgment rule.
Delaware defines the business judgment rule as "a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
12
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."
Alternatively, the business judgment rule can be described as a deferential standard of
review for duty of care cases. 13 Thus, although the standard of conduct for the duty of care
is something like ordinary care, the standard of review is gross negligence rather than mere
negligence, 14 Some would characterize the business judgment rule as a policy of nonreview, 15 although this characterization seems more appropriate with respect to the
16
substance of business decisions than to the decision-making process.
The next section considers the justification for the business judgment rule. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to note that the business judgment rule explains why there are so
few cases leading to director liability. Because the standard of review is so deferential, the
burden on the plaintiff is quite high. The natural consequence of such deference is that few
cases result in liability. Additionally, if it is difficult to recover against directors for breach
of the duty of care, then it may not be worthwhile to file many such lawsuits in the first
place. Furthermore, any meritorious cases are likely to settle early. 17 Thus, one should not
expect to find many cases leading to director liability based on the duty of care.
11. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). See also Velasco, supra note 4, at 546-53 (discussing

rationale for the divergence).
12.
13.

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 828-

29 (2004) ("It is better understood as either a standard of review or apolicy of non-review."); E. Norman Veasey
& Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004?
A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1417 (2005) (describing the business
judgment rule as a standard of review). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) ("The business judgment rule commonly is understood

today as a standard of liability by which courts review the decisions of the board of directors.").
14.

Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon

concepts of gross negligence.").
15. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 89-90 ("Alternatively ....the business judgment rule can be
seen as an abstention doctrine."); William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form. A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1297 (2001) ("[The business judgment rule] is an

expression of apolicy of non-review[.]"); Johnson, supra note 2, at 625 ("The business judgment rule. . , is better
understood as a...policy of non-review[.]") (emphasis in original).
16. See infra notes 26-29, 74-75, 324-327 and accompanying text (describing the difference in review for
substance of decision claims as compared to decision-making process claims).
17.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla

and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1984) ("[Clases are most often resolved by settlement, not
judicial decision ....
").
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In fact, the legal landscape is even more complicated. The law might have evolved to
allow directors less deference and give plaintiffs a better chance of recovering against
careless directors. In 1985, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 18 the Delaware Supreme Court held
directors personally liable for gross negligence. The case might have been a harbinger of
legislature acted quickly
things to come. However, it was not to be. Instead, the Delaware
20
states.
most
of
legislatures
the
did
developmentI9-as
to arrest
Under the laws of most states, director liability for breach of the duty of care either is,
or can be, limited or even eliminated altogether. For example, under Section 102(b)(7) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, corporations are permitted to include in their
charters an exculpation provision that essentially eliminates directors' exposure to personal
liability for breach of the duty of care. 21 Most public corporations quickly adopted such a
provision, such that they are now nearly ubiquitous. 22 As a result, it is fair (if not entirely
accurate) to say that directors generally cannot be held accountable for breaches of the duty
of care. Of course, if recovery of damages is no longer a possibility, then one would expect
to see very few lawsuits. Moreover, one could not expect the lawsuits that do arise to lead
to the imposition of personal liability on directors.
Thus, the empirical data cannot be said to reflect the nonexistence of a duty of care
but rather reflects the legal landscape characterized by a deferential business judgment rule
coupled with ubiquitous exculpation provisions. In light of the legal landscape, one could
expect more than simply a lack of liability or even a lack of cases. If successful duty of
care claims are rare, then one would expect to find cases channeled away from duty of care
issues and towards duty of loyalty issues whenever possible.
Fiduciary duties are not necessarily tidy concepts. The duty of care and the duty of
loyalty are not polar opposites, and in many cases may overlap. 23 In every case involving
a breach of fiduciary duty, the claim is that the directors are not pursuing the interests of
the shareholders. Many cases may involve violations of both the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty, and sometimes conduct might be characterized alternatively as a breach of
either. Thus, plaintiffs may have some leeway in deciding how to frame the case. They
may be able to allege breach of the duty of care, of loyalty, or of both. Because of the
18. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
19. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (authorizing corporations to add provisions to their
charters insulating directors from personal liability for breach of the duty of care).
20. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (authorizing corporations to add provisions to their
charters insulating directors from personal liability for breach of the duty of care). See also id. Statutory
Comparison 6, at 2-34 (2011 Rev.) (noting which states have adopted similar provisions).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
22. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians,Waiver of Liability
Provisions,and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 309-10 (2009) (describing the extent to which
companies are opting out of liability for directors); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why / Do Not Teach Van Gorkom,
34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (citing statistics); Miller, supra note 2, at 322 ("All, or virtually all, public
Delaware companies have opted out of liability[.]").
23. See Julian Velasco, How Many FiduciaryDuties Are There in CorporateLaw?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
1231, 1297 (2010) ("[T]he relationship among the various fiduciary duties is... complex. Thus, it is inadequate
to describe fiduciary duties as lying on a linear continuum."); In re Walt Disney Co. Derv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
746 n.402 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Perhaps these categories of care and loyalty, so rigidly defined and categorized in
Delaware for many years, are really just different ways of analyzing the same issue."); Coffee, supra note 17, at
792 (noting that the distinction between duty of care and duty of loyalty "is often fuzzy and is not susceptible to
a simple either/or test").
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business judgment rule and exculpation provisions, it is unlikely that they would
characterize a case as involving solely the duty of care. More likely, they would at least
characterize as involving both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. However, realizing
that the chances of prevailing on the duty of care claim are slim, they may not pursue it at
all or perhaps only halfheartedly. If so, then even cases that could have been successful
under the duty of care might be re-characterized as duty of loyalty cases.
Moreover, judges may be doing something similar. Even cases that have successful
claims under both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty may be decided solely under the
duty of loyalty. 24 Each court may not want to be the outlier that finds liability under the
duty of care when plaintiffs can be made whole under the less controversial duty of loyalty.
Thus, it is possible that there would be many more cases that could have been decided
in the plaintiffs' favor based on the duty of care but which were instead decided based on
the duty of loyalty. If so, the empirical data is incomplete. Instead of asking how many
cases have led to director liability based solely on the duty of care, the more important
inquiry might be how many cases could have led to liability under the duty of care. The
number would surely be zero where exculpation provisions are involved, and would still
be small when they are not involved, because of the business judgment rule. However,
there is reason to believe that the number of cases that couldhave led to liability under the
duty of care might be significantly more than the number of cases that have done so.
Thus, the empirical data-the fact that there are very few cases in which directors
have been held personally liable for damages solely as a result of a breach of the duty of
care-is not a strong basis on which to conclude that there is no duty of care. Given the
legal landscape, the data are in line with what should be expected. If we are to conclude
that there is no duty of care, it must be based on the legal landscape itself.
2. Business Judgment Rule
If the sheer lack of cases leading to director liability does not establish that the lack
of a meaningful duty of care, then perhaps the existence of the business judgment rule does.
As previously discussed, the business judgment rule can be understood alternatively as a
25
presumption, as a differential standard of review, or as a policy of non-review. However
it is described, the business judgment rule lies at the heart of the divergence between
standards of conduct and of review and results in deferential judicial review for breach of
the duty of care. Claims based on the substance of business decisions are reviewed under
27
while claims based on the decisionthe waste test, 26 which is almost insurmountable,

24.

Cf Tamar Frankel, Corporate Director's Duty of Care: The American Law Institute's Project on

CorporateGovernance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 705, 716 (1984) ("Courts do not base their decisions on the duty
of care as often as they do on the duty of loyalty, but invoke the duty of care in special cases when directors have
no conflicts of interest.").
25. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (describing the business judgment rule).
26. To establish waste claim, plaintiffs must show that consideration for a transaction "is so inadequate in
value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the corporation has
paid." Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (citations omitted). See also Lewis v. Vogelstean, 699
A 2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the waste standard); Glazer v. Zapata Corp, 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del.
Ch. 1993) (same).
27. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("That is 'an extreme test, very rarely
satisfied . . .") (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995);
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making process are reviewed under a gross negligence standard, 28 which is also extremely
demanding. 29 The business judgment rule explains why, historically, there have been so

few cases leading to director liability for breach of the duty of care. However, given this
strong presumption, deferential standard of review, or policy of non-review, perhaps it is
fair to say that there really is no meaningful duty of care.
Before we reach that conclusion, we need to consider the reasons behind the business
judgment rule. If the idea is that the duty of care need not be enforced strictly because it is
not very important, then the business judgment rule supports this conclusion. If, on the
other hand, there is some other reasoning, then perhaps the conclusion is inappropriate.
It turns out that the business judgment rule does not exist because the duty of care is
undervalued. 30 At least, judges never express any such sentiment. To the contrary, they
often opine on the importance of director diligence. And this comports with common sense:
of course directors of large corporations should be diligent rather than negligent! Their
decisions affect not only the shareholders but also the employees, other businesses, and
even the economy as a whole.
The justification for the business judgment rule lies somewhere else completely.
Because it is sure to be well known to the reader, I will not go into great detail. 3 1 Rather, I
will point out that the justifications can be categorized into two interrelated groups: the
theoretical and the practical. The theoretical foundation of the business judgment rule is
trust, and the practical foundation is risk.
Theoretically, the business judgment rule is founded on trust. 32 Judges presume that
directors are acting in good faith because they believe that, as a general matter, directors
can be trusted. To be sure, when directors have a conflict of interest, they cannot be trusted.
In such situations, courts apply the demanding entire fairness test, which requires directors
to bear the burden of proof. 3 3 However, when directors are not conflicted, their interests
generally are aligned with those of the shareholders. 34 Thus, courts do not need to police
the duty of care very closely. The deferential review of the business judgment rule allows

Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding that the waste test "has resulted in
no awards of money judgment against corporate officers or directors in this jurisdiction"). See also Allen et al.,
supra note 15, at 1318 ("[N]o Delaware case of which we are aware has ever held that a properly ratified
transaction constituted waste.").
28. See supra note 14 (discussing director liability).
29. See I BLOCK ET AL., supranote 6, at 134-40 (reviewing a history of the standard through various cases
utilizing it).
30. Velasco, supra note 4, at 539-40.
31. See generally I BLOCK ET AL., supranote 6, at 12-18 (describing the rationale for the business judgment
rule); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of CorporateOfficers and Directors,51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 95969 (1990); Velasco, supra note 13, at 828-34.
32. See Velasco, supranote 13, at 834.
33. See generally I BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 28 32; Velasco, supra note 13, at 834-38 (describing
the entire faimess test).
34. See Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1302 ("[A] board that is not conflicted is motivated to achieve the
highest transaction price the market will permit. Because in those circumstances the board's interests and the
interests of the shareholders are aligned, there is no reason for courts to engage in a substantive review of the
board's decision."); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 117
(1965) ("Generally speaking, managers' incentives and interests coincide with those of their shareholders in every
particular except one: they have no incentive, as managers, to buy management services for the company at the
lowest possible price.").
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courts to avoid wasting judicial resources on borderline cases that are more likely to be
about policy disagreements than actual negligence and focus their attention on only the
most egregious cases.
Practically, the business judgment rule is founded on risk. It is an accepted principal
of business that risk and return are related: you cannot expect to earn a profit without being
willing to accept risk, and higher profits generally require a willingness to accept greater
risks. 35 Thus, shareholders who invested in the corporation in the hope of making a profit
actually want the managers of the corporation to take on appropriate entrepreneurial risks
and do not want them to be overly cautious. 36 But managers are naturally more risk averse
than shareholders because they have more at stake-i.e., their jobs-than do diversified
shareholders. 37 Moreover, if the courts are strictly enforcing a duty of care and holding
directors liable for mistakes in judgment, then directors will surely become even more risk
averse. Directors would face the entire downside of a business decision-i.e., ruinous
personal liability-without benefiting from the upside of their actions-i.e., the profits that
go to the corporation and its shareholders. 38 Thus, to encourage directors to take on healthy
entrepreneurial risks, directors are afforded deferential review with respect to issues
involving the duty of care.
Properly understood, deferential review is a reasonable approach to handling duty of
care issues. It may seem counterintuitive, but judicial deference is intended entirely for the
benefit of the shareholders. Care is not undervalued; rather, enforcement is simply reduced.
This is not so exceptional: laws are not all enforced equally, and no law is enforced
perfectly. 39 The business judgment rule reflects a prudential judgment as to the appropriate
level of enforcement. 40 The duty of care is enforced lightly, lest the costs exceed the
benefits. 4 1 This decision does not support a move to eliminate the duty of care.
35. See generally KLEIN ET AL., BuSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 242 50 (11 th ed. 2010).
36. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Shareholders don't want
(or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse.").
37. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 802 ("Managers cannot diversify their portfolio ... because they are
essentially overinvested in their own firms."); Bainbndge, supra note 13, at 113 ("[M]anagers obviously cannot
diversify their human capital among a number of different firms.").
38. See William T. Allen et al., Realigningthe Standardof Review of DirectorDue Care with Delaware
Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its ProgenyAs a Standardof Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV.
449, 455 (2002) ("[T]he risk of liability, at least in the case of non-management directors, could be highly
disproportionate to their incentives for serving as a director. Liability for an imprudent decision could be in the
millions, but outside directors rarely receive annual fees commensurate with liability risk of that magnitude.");
Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 445 ("[A]t least in the case of non-management directors, liability for the losses
caused by an imprudent business decision would often be far out of proportion to the incentives for accepting a
directorship.").
39. See Velasco, supra note 4, at 580-85 (discussing underenforcement of legal duties).
40 See Allen et al., supranote 38, at 449-50 ("The more lenient standard creates a greater arena of freedom
for directors, because the standard is purposefully designed to encourage directors to act without undue
inhibition."); Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1296 ("The reasons [for the divergence between standards of conduct
and standards of review] are rooted in policy interests."); Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 467-68 ("If directors or
officers who violate the standards of reasonableness and fairness sometimes escape liability because of a less
demanding standard of review, it is not because they have acted properly, but because utilizing standards of review
that were fully congruent with the relevant standards of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of
letting some persons who violated their standards of conduct escape liability.").
41. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 467-68 ("[U]tilizing standards of review that [a]re fully congruent
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Underenforcement is a far cry from non-enforcement.
3. Exculpation
Even if the business judgment rule does not support a decision to eliminate the duty
of care, perhaps the authorization of exculpation provisions does. 4 2 It would seem difficult
to characterize the elimination of liability as underenforcement, rather than nonenforcement. Nevertheless, this section will argue that the existence of exculpation
provisions does not support the elimination of the duty of care.
Consider the statutory language in Delaware:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation
may also contain any or all of the following matters:...
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this
title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
43
personal benefit.
It is noteworthy that the exculpation provision authorized by Delaware law does not
eliminate the duty of care. 44 It only limits or eliminates the directors' exposure to personal
liability for breach of the duty of care. The duty of care itself remains. Although damages
against directors are no longer an option, injunctive relief is. 45 This solution reflects the
concern discussed earlier that the risk of personal liability would lead directors to excessive
risk aversion. Exculpation provisions allow corporations to eliminate that risk, but not the
other benefits of the duty of care.
Moreover, only directors can be exculpated under Delaware law. Officers cannot be
exculpated, and therefore damages remain an option against many corporate actors. 46 This

with the relevant standards of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of letting some persons who
violated their standards of conduct escape liability."); Velasco, supra note 4, at 552.
42. Different states have authorized exculpation provisions in different ways. See generally MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02, at 2-34 to -41 (2002) (comparing exculpation provisions across states); 2 WILLIAM E.
KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS ch. 16, at 16-1 to -24 (7th ed.
2003) (discussing history of exculpation provisions). While in most states it is an opt-in provision, see id. at 163, in some states it is either an opt-out provision, see e.g., WIS. STAT. § 180.0828(2) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(D) (2013), or mandatory, see, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(e) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 607.0831
(2013); VA CODE § 13.1-692.1 (2013) Some states automatically limit the maximum liability of directors. See,
e.g., VA CODE § 13.1-692.1 (2013).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014).
44. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 970 ("Although at first glance this statute might seem to enable the
virtual elimination of the duty of care, the statute falls short of taking that position[.]").
45. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001) ("Such a charter provision, when adopted,
would not affect injunctive proceedings based on gross negligence."); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc.,
678 A.2d 533, 542 (Del. 1996) (discussing "the availability of injunctive relief').
46. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 n.37 (Del. 2009) ("[T]here currently is no statutory
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is potentially significant in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's (surprisingly recent)
holding that officers have the same fiduciary duties as directors. 47 Although cases against
officers are rare, presumably because it is difficult for shareholders to maintain a derivative
action against officers, 48 the duty of care is technically alive and well as against officers.
In addition, exculpation is optional under Delaware law-and the law of some other
states 49 -and
requires an affirmative opt-in by the shareholders. Although most
corporations have exculpation provisions, not all do. So even if the adoption of an
exculpation provision could be considered the elimination of the duty of care, further
justification would be required to force this decision upon corporations that have not
elected it for themselves. 50 Moreover, as the law stands, corporations can freely choose to
remove exculpation provisions from their charters, thereby restoring the duty of care.
Again, justification would be required to eliminate this option.
The history of exculpation provisions might be thought to provide additional support
for the elimination of the duty of care. Exculpation provisions came about in response to
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.5 1 This legislative
response was clearly a rejection of the holding in that case. 52 The exact meaning of the
response, however, is not clear. The Van Gorkom case "was the first Delaware case to
actually hold directors liable for breach of the duty of care in a case in which the board had
made a business decision." 53 In light of that fact, it is easy to suppose that exculpation
provisions reflect a rejection of the imposition of damages for breach of the duty of care.
However, this reading might be too broad.
The fact that the directors were held liable in the Van Gorkom case sent shock waves
throughout the corporate world. 54 According to conventional wisdom, insurance
companies suddenly refused to provide directors and officers insurance, and many people

provision authorizing comparable exculpation of corporate officers.").

47. See id. at 708-09 (holding that "the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors").
48. Ordinarily, the board ofdirectors gets to decide whether the corporation should bring a lawsuit on behalf
of the company. However, when directors are conflicted, the courts may allow shareholders to bring a derivative
action on behalf of the corporation. Although directors may easily be conflicted on the issue of whether a lawsuit
should be brought charging themselves with breach of fiduciary duty, they are less likely to be conflicted on the
issue of whether a lawsuit should be brought charging officers with breach of fiduciary duty.
49. See, e.g, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney 2014) (authorizing exculpation provisions); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 2014) (same); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (same).

50.

"Delaware's legislative policy is to look to the will of the stockholders in these areas." Williams v.

Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996).

51. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). It was not, however, the first Delaware case to hold
directors liable for breach of the duty of care. See infra note 58 and accompanying text (citing earlier case)
52.

See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) ("The statute was, in

fact, a legislative response to this Court's liability holding in Van Gorkom.").
53.

See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS

ORGANIZATION 234 (4th ed. 2012).
54. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 42, § 16.01, at 16-1 to -2 (7th ed. 2005) (describing legislative
response to the Van Gorkom decision).
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56
refused to become directors of public corporations. 5 5 Even accepting this account, the

question remains as to why liability in the Van Gorkom case was so shocking.
One possibility is the finding of liability itself. It was commonly believed that
directors had never been held liable for breach of the duty of care and perhaps everyone
thought that they never would be. 5 7 However, this account seems dubious. In the first place,
the Delaware Chancery Court had previously held directors liable for breach of the duty of
59
58
care. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court had held open the possibility of liability.
60
clearly
In fact, it had recently established the "gross negligence" standard -which
opened up the possibility of liability-without much uproar. It seems unlikely that anyone
believed that liability was an impossibility.
More likely, it was the circumstances under which directors were held liable that
caused problems in the Van Gorkom case. Although the Delaware Supreme Court
61
they held directors liable
reaffirmed that the standard of review was gross negligence,
62
and
under circumstances that many people did not believe amounted to gross negligence,
63
If the directors' actions in that
some thought did not even amount to simple negligence.
case could lead to liability, then everyone's assumptions concerning the business judgment

rule had been wrong-perhaps the business judgment rule had been implicitly overruled.

55. See Roberta Romano, CorporateGovernance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J.
1155, 1160 (1990) [hereinafter Romano, Aftermath] ("Delaware hoped to ease the insurance crisis by eliminating
liability relating to duties typically covered by D&O insurance."); Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With
Directors'andOfficers'LiabilityInsurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1-2 (1989) ("There are reports of directors
resigning because their firms had lost insurance coverage and of individuals declining invitations to serve on
boards in increasing numbers ").
56. Roberta Romano has suggested that the insurance cnsis actually had many causes, and was not simply
due to the Van Gorkom holding. Romano, Aftermath, supranote 55, at 1157-59.
57. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director'sDuty of CareA "Fiduciary"Duty? Does
It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2013) ("By the mid-1980s ... the perception of the
marketplace remained that monetary liability could not be imposed upon a director short of disloyalty[.]").
58. See, eg., Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585 (1961) (holding independent directors liable for gross
negligence in failing to adequately monitor management).
59. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[T]he question of whether a
corporate director has become liable for losses to the corporation through neglect of duty is determined by the
circumstances."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (adopting gross negligence standard); see
also Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, DangerousLiaisons: CorporateLaw, Trust Law, and InterdoctrinalLegal
Transplants, 96 NW U. L. REV. 651, 658 (2002) ("In three cases in the early 1970s, the court of chancery
recognized an enforceable duty of care. In none of these cases was liability imposed on directors.").
60. Aronson, 473 A 2d at 812.
61. Id.
62. See. e.g., Allen et al., supra note 38, at 458 ("These failures of process may well have constituted
ordinary negligence (though some observers dispute even that), but it is difficult to argue that those failures
constituted true gross negligence ....); Quillen, supranote 8, at 498 ("[W]hatever anyone thinks of the directors'
activity in [Van Gorkom], most commentators have not viewed the activity as grossly negligent ...").
63. See, e.g, Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 448 ("[A] gross-negligence standard of review is often associated
with Delaware, but in the famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom the Delaware court, although purporting to apply
that standard of review, in fact held outside directors to be liable for conduct that many observers believe did not
constitute even ordinary negligence."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98
YALE L.J. 127, 129 (1988) ("[T]he facts did not support a finding of negligence, much less gross negligence[.]");
Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business ofJudgingBusiness Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187,
1188 (1986) ("To most (including the authors) the court's decision [in Smith v. Van Gorkom] seems misguided
and [the directors'] actions entirely proper.").
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This scenario would more likely lead to outrage than would the mere possibility of
64
liability.
Under this view, exculpation statutes do not reflect the determination that there should
be no liability for breach of the duty of care. Instead, such statutes may simply reflect a
desire to restore the deference due under the business judgment rule. 65 Liability should be
rare, but if the courts can no longer be trusted, then shareholders should be permitted to
eliminate liability altogether rather than suffer the consequences of excessive liability.
Nevertheless, it might be argued that, although the existence of exculpation provisions
do not logically support the elimination of the duty of care, the ubiquity of such provisions
provides a strong argument that elimination would be a wise course of action. For example,
according to Professors Edward Rock and Michael Wachter, shareholders overwhelmingly
approved exculpation provisions at a time when shareholding was already concentrated in
the hands of institutions, and at the beginning of the rise of institutional investor activism.
In the years since, as institutional investors have become increasingly active, there has been
no pressure on firms to re-amend their charters to expose their directors to monetary
liability for negligent breaches of the duty of care. This is strong evidence that a judicially
enforced duty of care is not in shareholders' interests. "At the very least, intelligent and
66
sophisticated shareholders do not think it is in their interests."
Although the argument seems persuasive, it actually has limited value. The
widespread adoption of exculpation provisions can speak only to the issue of personal
liability for directors, not to other aspects of the duty of care, which are unaffected.
Moreover, it is not clear that we should expect what Rock and Wachter suggest. Repeal of
exculpation provisions can only be accomplished by charter amendment and thus require
director approval. Because this would be extremely difficult to obtain, it is not clear that
activists would waste their efforts on it. In other words, the failure to repeal may be a sign
of hopelessness rather than acceptance.
Ultimately, neither the existence of exculpation provisions nor their widespread
adoption provides strong support for a move to eliminate the duty of care altogether. Like
the business judgment rule, exculpation provisions merely reflect the fact that enforcement
of the duty of care is a tricky issue. Underenforcement is decidedly better than overenforcement. But that does not mean that complete elimination is better still.
B. Undesirable
A second line of argument is that the duty of care is actually undesirable as a practical
matter. There are three main reasons why this might be so: judicial incompetence, litigation
costs, and director risk aversion. This Section will consider each in turn.

64. Of course, there are those who believe that liability should not be premised upon a breach of the duty
of care. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, A Kindler, Gentler Critiqueof Van Gorkom and Its Less Celebrated

Legacies, 96 Nw. U.L. REV. 595, 595 (2002) ("[L]ike many others, I believe ... that damages actions premised
solely upon an alleged lack of director care are a poor, even destructive, corporate governance tool.").
65.

Cf Allen et al., supra note 38, at 450 ("Van Gorkom ... run[s] counter to Delaware public policies

restricting the judicial enforcement of the duty of care to cases where directors have acted in a manner that
represents an extreme departure from expected normative behavior[.]").
66.

Rock & Wachter, supranote 59, at 659-60.
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1. JudicialIncompetence
One reason why the duty of care might be considered undesirable is because courts
are not particularly good at deciding such cases. Courts are not business experts; they are
not qualified to evaluate business decisions. 67 Of course, the problem with the judicial
incompetence argument generally is that courts are not experts in any number of fields into
which they are forced to venture. 68 Many of those fields are significantly more complicated
than business. For example, courts are not medical experts, either; yet they must, from time
to time, sit in judgment over doctors. 69 Thus, the argument proves too much.
However, the argument can be reformulated more modestly. Most of the time,
70
business decisions are likely to involve issues on which reasonable people can disagree.
On such matters, court decisions are not likely to add value; they are more likely to amount
to second-guessing. 7 1 Despite this shortcoming, courts may be necessary for duty of loyalty
cases because directors cannot be trusted when they have conflicts of interest. 72 However,
67. See, e.g., Brehm v Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) ("Courts are ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the
'adequacy' of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk ")
(quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)); Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1046
(Pa. 1997) ("[The business judgment] doctrine prevents courts from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate
decision-making, a task they are ill-equipped to perform.") (citation omitted); Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp.,
643 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Conn. 1994) ("Courts recognize that managers have both better information and better
incentives than they .... Not only do businessmen know more about business than judges do, but competition..
• provides sufficient punishment for businessmen who commit more than their share of business mistakes.")
(citation omitted); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990) ("Judges are not
business experts and therefore should not substitute their judgment for the judgment of the directors.") (citation
omitted); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he business judgment doctnne, at least
in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate
what are and must be essentially business judgments."); Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("The
judges are not business experts."); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The Business Judgment
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631-32 (2002) ("In litigation, the [business judgment] rule is a means for
conserving judicial resources, thereby permitting courts to avoid being mired down in rehashing decisions that
are inherently subjective and ill suited for judges, as opposed to business men and women.").
68. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 304-21 (1994) ("[S]uch lack of judicial expertise does not distinguish business decisions
from medicine and innumerable other fields in which the negligence system holds sway.") (citations omitted).
69. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 573, 581 ("Can
anyone seriously argue that surgeons in the operating room, lawyers in the midst of a heated trial, or accountants
up against a closing deadline are not also called upon to make snap judgments in response to circumstances that
may be difficult to recreate [sic] in a courtroom years later? Nonetheless, our legal system is quite comfortable
relying on the device of litigation to review, invariably with the benefit of hindsight, the quality of these
professionals' performances and to assess damages, often in the millions of dollars, when those performances are
found wanting. Why should directors be any different?").
70. Velasco, supra note 13, at 834.
71. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is
a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate
decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and
to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later
against a background of perfect knowledge.") See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological
Theory of Judgingin Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 619-23 (1998).
72. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 834-35 ("If the key insight of the business judgment rule is that directors
generally can be trusted, the key insight of the entire faimrness test is that this is not always so ....
[Tihere are
times when [the directors' and shareholders'] interests conflict.").
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73
when directors are not conflicted, judicial incapacity must be taken more seriously.
This is a much stronger argument, but it does not support the elimination of the duty
of care. The argument works much better with respect to substance and arguably supports
the elimination of the review of the merits of business decisions. 74 It is less strong with
respect to the decision-making process. 75 Courts are particularly skilled at evaluating

procedural issues, which are less likely (although not entirely unlikely) to be issues about
which reasonable minds would differ dramatically. Thus, while it may be fair to say that
courts are incompetent to review the substance of business decisions, it is not fair to say
that courts are incompetent to review the decision-making process.
To the extent that courts do lack the expertise to review the directors' decision-making
processes, this shortcoming is better addressed by deferential review than by eliminating
the duty of care. The business judgment rule addresses this concern nicely. Because courts
may not be confident that they can determine when directors have been negligent, they
only hold directors accountable when they find gross negligence. 76 The deference ensures
that, despite judicial incompetence, directors generally will be held accountable only when
they deserve to be-i.e., when they actually are negligent. By contrast, the incompetence
of judges is not a very good reason to leave directors unaccountable in the most extreme
cases.
2. Litigation Costs
One might reasonably question the value of highly deferential review. After all, if so
few cases lead to liability, then perhaps there is little benefit coming from duty of care
cases. One can reasonably question whether it is worth the litigation costs incurred by
society to obtain that small benefit. Perhaps it would be better, from a cost-benefit
77
perspective, to eliminate the duty of care.
Although this is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Article, there are
reasons to believe that a cost-benefit analysis would not support eliminating the duty of
care. First of all, the costs associated with the duty of care likely are not very high. Because
of the business judgment rule, and all the more because of exculpation provisions, duty of

73. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the SelfGoverning Corporation, 149 U PA L. REV. 1619, 1651 (2001) ("On the substance, courts with inferior
information will do systematically worse than the internal governance mechanism.").
74. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify
directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only."); In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) ("[C]ompliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately bejudicially determined by reference
to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss[.]"). Many scholars believe that courts should
not review the substance of business decisions absent some other breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Bainbndge,
supra note 13, at 90 (discussing the business judgment rule as a judicial abstention doctrine); Andrew S. Gold, A
Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial
Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398,401 (2007); Johnson, supra note 15, at 631-32; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra
note 13, at 1421-24.
75. Many scholars have supported a substance-process distinction under the business judgment rule. See,
e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 120 (1979); Eisenberg,
supranote 31, at 965; Quillen, supra note 8, at 500-0 1.
76. See Velasco, supranote 4, at 550-52.
77. See Scott, supra note 5.
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care cases do not create tremendous litigation costs. 78 Pure duty of care cases are rare.
More often, a care claim is appended to a loyalty lawsuit, but it is not pursued aggressively,
and is easily dismissed. It would be difficult to maintain that duty of care litigation is

running amok.
Moreover, the benefit side of the equation may not be as empty as the detractors
suggest. 7 9 Because even a rare finding of liability can be so very consequential, 8 0 it is
reasonable to believe that, in addition to any negative effects, such cases will have a

positive deterrent effect on directors. 8 1 In other words, a very few negative judgments can
go a long way in keeping directors honest. 82
Ideally, the effect is twofold. First, it can remind directors that, if they go too far, they
may be held liable (unless, of course, there is an exculpation provision in place). Second,

83
it can give directors an indication of at least the outer boundaries of acceptable behavior.

For example, when the Delaware Supreme Court in Brehm v. Eisner8 4 opined on the duty

of care and suggested that "[lt]his is potentially a very troubling case on the merits" that
"pushes the envelope ofjudicial respect for the business judgment of directors,"

85

directors

across the country were put on notice that they were reaching the limits of judicial
forbearance. In subsequent opinions in that case, the court explained more fully what
directors should have done differently. 86 Even though the defendants were not held liable,
wise directors should have learned that they must be more careful in the future. 8 7 However,

78. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 827 ("[D]ue care litigation has been only a small tail on a much larger
dog."); Velasco, supra note 13, at 884-87 (discussing how corporate law cuts off litigation for care cases); cf
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1094
(1997) ("[l~t is possible that the accepted wisdom that litigation is brought in almost every deal is simply an
overstatement.").
79. Cf Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) ("[lf we failed to balance all the
interests involved, we would in the name of practicality andjudicial economy foreclose a judicial decision on the
merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary or desirable.").
80. For example, the consequences of the Van Gorkom case, holding directors liable for a breach of the
duty of care, were quite significant. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1277
(1999) (describing "the deterrent effect" as among "the most important" and the "most obvious" of "benefits of
shareholder suits to shareholders as a class"); Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's LegacyThe Limits of Judicially EnforcedConstraintsand the Promise of ProprietaryIncentives, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 579,
580 (2002) ("The impact of Van Gorkom lies not in its holding, which has been eviscerated by subsequent
legislative action, but in its refocusing the corporate governance debate on deficiencies in the role of directors
and unleashing a richer array of alternative constraints that include markets, contracts, and norms."); Rock, supra
note 78, at 1103 ("[E]ven the corporate actor who is immune to the social sanctions of Delaware corporate law
will be constrained to some degree by Delaware 'law."').
82. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 912 ("[Tlhe impact of catching a few additional cases of abuse should
not be underestimated.").
83. Cf Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55,
85 (1991) ("[L]egal rules are public goods. All firms benefit from a judicial decision clarifying the scope of
permissible conduct. The benefit of clarification is not simply deterrence of future managerial misconduct, but
rather ... identification of a rule around which the parties (managers and shareholders) can transact.").
84. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
85. Id. at 249.
86. See, e g, In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (affirming the lower court's
ruling that the directors did not breach their duty of care following a $130 million severance payout to the former
Disney president).
87. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 ("Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices ... can
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if the duty of care were eliminated altogether, the courts would have no opportunity to
opine on director care. Directors would have no indication of where the limits were88
essentially, there would be none!
To be sure, the courts can make mistakes. Smith v. Van Gorkom 89 could be considered
the perfect example: directors were held personally liable for conduct that many people
believe was not even negligent, much less grossly negligent. 90 However, the case must be
kept in perspective. It was a unique case in Delaware history. 9 1 Far more common are the
cases where many believe that directors got away with gross negligence. Although judicial
error is inevitable, it is hard to argue that it is biased against directors in the realm of
92
corporate law.
Moreover, the existence of exculpation provisions should quell any concerns.
Corporations can, and generally do, eliminate personal liability of directors for breach of
the duty of care. As a result, litigation costs are kept to a minimum.
3. Risk Aversion
Another reason why a duty of care may be undesirable is because of director risk
aversion. As discussed earlier, directors are naturally risk-averse, while shareholders are
not-and they do not want directors to be. 93 The potential for liability for breach of the
duty of care can only make matters worse. 94 By eliminating the duty of care, perhaps we
can eliminate the disincentives that skew director conduct.
Although the foregoing argument is corporate law dogma, it has limited applicability

usually help directors avoid liability."); Rock, supra note 78, at 1103 ("[T]he 'thick-skinned' businessman wants
to skate close to the edge ....But his lawyer is likely to advise him that such behavior will make it more likely
that the deal will be enjoined, or that he will be left unprotected against maneuvers by his opponents."). I have
argued in the past that too much deference under the business judgment rule can have an opposite effect: "Under
the business judgment rule, courts are limited in their ability to develop the standard of conduct under the duty of
care. Because the standards of review are mere rationality and gross negligence, courts spend far more time
justifying shoddy behavior than demanding excellence." Velasco, supra note 13, at 916 (citations omitted). See
also Coffee, supra note 17, at 798 ("[T]he impact of minimum standards may well be to communicate an
unintended message that compliance with the minimum is all that should be expected."). This is not inconsistent
with the current claim. If too much deference can be bad, then, afortiori,zero accountability is worse. For a more
complete discussion of the expressive and pedagogical role of law, see infra Part lil.E.
88. For a discussion of the need for enforceability, see infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
89. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
90. See supranotes 61-63 and accompanying text.
91. The Technicolor, Inc. litigation is another case where the courts found the directors were grossly
negligent. However, the courts ultimately concluded that the transaction was entirely fair despite the directors'
gross negligence, and directors were not held personally liable. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d
1156, 1179 80 (Del. 1995).
92. Professor Bainbridge has argued that, "If the business judgment rule is treated as a standard of liability,
rather than as an abstention doctrine, [i.e., if there is an enforceable duty of care] judicial intervention readily
could become the norm rather than the exception." Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 127. However, as an empirical
matter, history has proven this to be a very slight nsk. An equally plausible claim could be made to the reverse
effect; if there is no enforceable duty of care, then director misconduct could become the norm rather than the
exception.
93. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing differing risk profiles of directors and
shareholders).
94. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing impact of potential liability on directors' risk
aversion).
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to the issue at hand. The argument is at its strongest when discussing the risk of liability
for bad outcomes. 95 If directors had to guarantee that their decisions would lead to good
outcomes, there would indeed be a serious problem. However, that is not the case. The core
of the business judgment rule shields the substance of business decisions from judicial
review, 96 at least in all but the most extreme cases. 97 The duty of care is not concerned
with outcomes. Rather, the duty of care looks at director diligence and the decision-making
process. 98 It is far more reasonable to hold directors legally accountable for the care they
exercise than for the results they generate because the former is in their direct control while
the latter is not.
Nevertheless, the argument against the duty of care does not focus on objective
reasonableness, but on actual incentives. The fact remains that liability, if imposed, could
be ruinous. 99 Thus, it could be argued that the duty of care, even if otherwise reasonable,
distorts directors' incentives to the detriment of shareholders.
However, the fact that the mere possibility of liability can provide a disincentive is
not a very strong argument. There is also the possibility of liability for breach of the duty
of loyalty and of criminal laws; these, too, can provide unfortunate disincentives at the
margins. Sometimes we simply have to accept some unfortunate disincentives to provide
appropriate incentives. The question then becomes whether the benefits of the duty of care
outweigh the drawbacks.
Of course, the duty of care is significantly different than the duty of loyalty or criminal
law in some important respects. For example, criminal law and, to a lesser extent, the duty
of loyalty have as their main goal the prohibition of misconduct-i.e., crime and unfair
self-dealing. The duty of care, on the other hand, seeks to mandate good behavior-i.e.,
diligence. 100 It is generally considered more important to prevent misconduct than to
require good conduct. 10 1 Moreover, care is considered by many to be a nebulous concept
that lacks bright lines. 102 It is difficult for directors to be sure that they have exercised due
95. See supra notes 74 75 and accompanying text (discussing relative validity of risk aversion argument
with respect to issues of substance and process).
96. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
97. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 1998) ("Irrationality is the outer limit of the business
judgment rule."). See also I BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 84-90, 93-97 (discussing abuse of discretion and
waste standards); Rosenberg, supranote 8, at 304 ("It is well settled that the business judgment rule will not allow
review of director decision that, in retrospect, are 'pretty dumb,' 'substantially wrong, or degrees of wrong
extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational'[.]").
98. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 ("Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.").
99. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
100. See Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts ofDuty in FiduciaryRelationships,54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 120
(2004) ("The fiduciary's duty of care.., requires affirmative conduct to act in the principal's interest with respect
to the assets or affairs of the principal entrusted to the fiduciary.").
101. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-9 (rev. ed. 1969) (distinguishing "morality of duty"
from "morality of aspiration"); Laby, supra note 100, at 129-33 (discussing "the sentiment that one generally
treats harm from failing to act more leniently than harm from committing an act").
102. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory ofIndeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1908, 1909-10 (1998) (describing fiduciary duty standards as "indetermina[tel," "vague," and "openended," which "make[s] prediction of legal outcomes difficult"); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supranote 13, at 1412
("Because Delaware fiduciary duty law is judge-made, it is 'far from clear and predictable' and therefore
'demonstrates a degree of indeterminacy'[.]"); William F. Kennedy, The StandardofResponsibilityforDirectors,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 624, 632 (1984) ("[Nlegligence is not a self-defining concept from which one can deduce
a set of particulanzed expectations as to how directors should behave[.]").
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care, 10 3 and it is difficult for the courts to be confident that they have not. 104 Given that all
parties involved are prone to make mistakes, it may seem unfair to subject directors to the
possibility of ruinous liability.
These are very strong arguments. However, there are ways to deal with them short of
eliminating the duty of care. Again, the business judgment rule provides for deferential
judicial review. 105 Although the standard of conduct requires directors to avoid negligence,
the standard of review provides that they shall only be held liable for gross negligence.
This is not because we believe that gross negligence is the theoretically appropriate
06
standard. Rather, it is to allow the parties room for error. 1
Although the gross negligence standard has been criticized extensively, 107 it is not
terribly problematic. It was intended to be a far more forgiving standard than ordinary
negligence 10 8 and, for the most part, has proven to be so in corporate law. To be sure, both
directors and the courts can make mistakes on the issue of gross negligence. However,
because gross negligence is far more forgiving than mere negligence, it is highly unlikely
that the courts will find non-negligent behavior to be grossly negligent.I 0 9 If a court
erroneously concludes that director behavior was grossly negligent, it is extremely likely
that the directors were nevertheless ordinarily negligent-and therefore deserving of
liability.1 0 Understood in this way, the business judgment rule does not give directors a
pass for negligent behavior. It merely enforces a lower standard to ensure that directors
will never be held liable for non-negligent behavior. Directors are thus freed from any
reasonable concern with liability: as long as they are attempting to be diligent, it is
extremely unlikely that they will be held liable, even if they make some mistakes along the
way. '''
At this point, the argument for eliminating the duty of care altogether becomes very
weak. It would have to rely on one of two assumptions: either that directors are extremely
103. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models And
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992) (stating that fiduciary duty standards "can never
be fully realized nor even defined with specificity in advance").
104. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 59, at 667 ("[J]udges cannot reliably distinguish between negligent
and non-negligent behavior.").
105. Supranotes 35-41 and accompanying text.
106. See generallv Velasco, supra note 4, at 546-53 (discussing "room for error" justification for business
judgment rule); Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 444, 465 ("[l]t may often be difficult for factfinders to distinguish
between bad decisions ... that turn out badly.").
107. See, eg, W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 210-11 (5th ed. 1984) ("The
prevailing rule in most situations is that there are no 'degrees' of care or negligence, as a matter of law; there are
only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact. From this perspective, 'gross' negligence is merely the same
thing as ordinary negligence, 'with the addition,' as Baron Rolfe once put it, 'of a vituperative epithet."') (citations
omitted). See also Arsht, supranote 75, at 120 n. 119 (citing sources).
108. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1983) ("[A] long line of Delaware cases holds that
director liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.").
109. See Velasco, supra note 4, at 551 ("[D]irectors may wrongly be found to have acted with gross
negligence. That is likely only when directors were actually negligent, however. It seems highly unlikely that a
director who acted with due care will be found to have been grossly negligent."). But see supra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text (discussing the Van Gorkom case).
110. See Velasco, supra note 4, at 550 ("If the legal system were perfect .... [o]nly directors who were
actually negligent.., would face liability. Such directors should be held liable.").
111. See Velasco, supranote 4, at 551 ("Directors can feel confident that, as long as they try to act with due
care, they will not be found liable for breach of the duty of care.").
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risk-averse, such that even the business judgment rule is inadequate to alleviate their fears,
or that the duty of care is intrinsically harmful because any preoccupation with care on the
part of directors will lead to excessive caution.
The first assumption is highly unlikely. Although directors may be risk averse,
presumably this preference is strictly rational, not irrational. Directors are unlikely to be
exceptionally faint of heart or to jump at shadows. 112 Thus, it does not seem fair to assume
that directors are extremely risk-averse.
The second assumption is more interesting. It suggests that the business environment
is such that it is often inappropriate for directors to spend any thought on care issues
because it is likely to lead to excessive caution. In other words, even conduct that is clearly
gross negligence under any standard is sometimes appropriate under the circumstances.
Although that is a possibility, the legal rule should be based on typical cases, not the rare
exceptional one. Moreover, care is a contextual concept and already should be open to the
possibility that some circumstances require less process than others. 113 There is no need to
eliminate the duty of care because it can accommodate this concern to a large extent.
Elimination of the duty of care would go too far: it seems highly unlikely that directors
should never (or only rarely) be expected to worry about process.
However, even if these arguments against the duty of care have merit, it is still not
enough reason to eliminate the duty of care because of the existence of exculpation
provisions. 114 Corporations can, and most do, eliminate personal liability of directors for
breach of the duty of care. 115 With the possibility of liability off the table, the argument
from risk aversion vanishes completely. It simply cannot support the elimination of the
duty of care. To argue otherwise, one would have to maintain that the directors are so risk
averse that they would be overly cautious in their business decisions because of the slight
possibility of an injunction. 116 At some point, the argument becomes too strained to
maintain with a straight face.
C. Unnecessary
A third line of argument is that the duty of care is unnecessary. Even if the duty of
care is not undesirable, we do not need it. Other forces, such as other law and markets, are
sufficient. If this is so, then perhaps we ought to eliminate the duty of care.
112. See Rock, supra note 78, at 1100 ("One might suspect ... 'that being a successful businessman requires
having a very thick skin, even enjoying the reputation of someone who skates close to the edge, even being
something of an outlaw."') (quoting Letter from Enck Posner). But ef David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L.REV. 1811, 1812 (2001) ("The directors of large U.S. corporations are, in the words of one
shareholder activist, 'the most reputationally sensitive people in the world."').
113. The standard of conduct under the duty of care is nearly always described contextually. For example,
in Delaware, "directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care
which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.

Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). Under the Model Business Corporation Act, directors must "discharge their
duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
circumstances." MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.30(b) (2005). The circumstances are built into the duty of care
analysis.
114. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
115. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of exculpation provisions).
116. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that injunctive relief remains available despite
adoption of exculpation provision).
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1. Other Law
Fiduciary duties are not the only laws that regulate director behavior. Modem
corporations operate in a world replete with regulation. From general law, including
contracts, torts, and criminal law, to corporate, securities, and antitrust law, to agency
regulation for certain industries, to quasi-regulation, such as by generally accepted
accounting principles, corporations and the directors that manage them are subject to a
great number and variety of legal rules. In light of all this, it might seem reasonable to
suggest that another layer of regulation through the duty of care is unnecessary.
However, it is unfair to point to the large number of rules and suggest that more are
unnecessary if the other rules have little or nothing to do with the concerns addressed by
the duty of care. General law, such as contracts, torts, and criminal law, applies to everyone
and is barely relevant to the issues at hand. Certain industries, such as banks and other
financial institutions, are subject to special regulation, but that cannot obviate the need for
a duty of care that applies to all corporations. The same can be said for antitrust laws, which
only apply to corporations in certain circumstances. And while corporate law is more
extensive than just fiduciary duties, it chooses to regulate managers' behavior primarily by
means of fiduciary duties, including the duty of care.
Securities regulation and accounting rules are somewhat different. For the most part,
they regulate information acquisition and disclosure rather than the decision-making
process that is the concern of the duty of care. However, the decision-making process 'is
intimately involved with information issues. Thus, it is inevitable that securities regulation
and accounting rules would have a significant effect on the decision-making process, if
only indirectly. Requiring corporations to maintain and disclose detailed information about
the company will certainly assist directors in remaining informed about the business. Thus,
of all the areas of law, this is the area that is most likely to provide a sufficient alternative
to the duty of care.
However, securities regulation and accounting rules do not obviate the need for the
duty of care. First, they do not apply to all corporations, but only to public corporations. In
addition, they do not regulate all corporate information equally. Rather, they focus on the
generation and disclosure of information that the corporation must make public. They do
not directly regulate the additional private information that directors need to make effective
decisions. Thus, they do not serve the same purpose as the duty of care. Moreover, the
availability of information does not ensure that it will be used. 117 Securities regulation
makes almost no effort to ensure that directors are doing a good job; its primary concern is
that they not mislead the shareholders. 118 The actual performance of their duties is not a
concern. Thus, the duty of care remains necessary.
In short, the existence of multiple areas of regulation does not necessarily obviate the
need for others that address different concerns. Moreover, the duty of care is not simply
another area of regulation. It is a very different kind of regulation-one that is based

117. It is not fanciful to suggest that directors may not utilize all the information that is generated by the
corporation. Unlike officers and employees, the directors work for the corporation on a part-time basis. They have
neither the time nor the inclination to review all the information that is available.
118. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1997) ("[O]nce full and fair disclosure has occurred,
the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concem of [federal securities law].").
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primarily on standards rather than rules. 119
In many cases, the law operates primarily on the basis of ex ante rules. Laws set forth,
with specificity, what can and cannot be done. This allows people to know exactly what
the law requires and forbids. Generally, business law is well-suited to straight-forward, ex
ante rules-based regulation. Businesses can deal with almost any level of regulation,
provided they know what the rules are and can plan accordingly. However, sometimes it is
difficult or even impossible to specify in advance what must and cannot be done. In such
cases, there is a need for alternative forms of regulation.
For example, ex ante rules-based regulation is a particularly inadequate way to
regulate management's discretion in its pursuit of shareholder interests. Business
circumstances are fluid, and steeped in uncertainty. Under such circumstances, it is
difficult-perhaps even impossible, and certainly unwise-to specify what directors
should and should not be doing. Any specific regulation would be as likely to be harmful
in many circumstances as it would be helpful in others. The likely effect would be to squash
the entrepreneurial spirit and replace it with a bureaucratic one-a result that the
shareholders would want to avoid. Thus, when it comes to fiduciary duties, corporate law
120
makes a dramatic shift towards ex post, standards-based regulation.
As opposed to rules, standards give only a general indication of what is required. The
law tells corporate officers and directors that they must pursue the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, but otherwise grants them considerable discretion to
decide upon a course of action. They are then subject to an after-the-fact review of the
propriety of their actions. 12 1 As a result, management is free to respond to changing
circumstances as it deems appropriate-without being restricted by detailed rules.
However, directors and officers can be held accountable if they abuse their discretion. As
long as directors' actions are reviewed with the appropriate level of deference, shareholders
get the benefit of both entrepreneurialism and accountability. This is something that ex

119. 1do not mean to suggest that the duty of care, or fiduciary duties, is the only source of standards-based
regulation of corporations. I only claim that fiduciary duties are based more heavily on standards than most other
forms of corporate regulation, and therefore add significant value to the regulatory mix. For a discussion of the
difference between rules and standards, see generally REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 39-40 & Table 2-1 (2009) (discussing the difference
between ex ante and ex post regulation in the corporate context); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards. An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1993) (offering an economic analysis of the consequences of promulgating
legal commands as rules or standards); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1986)
(highlighting and explaining the differences between rules and standards).
120. See Allen et al., supranote 15, at 1289 ("[Tlhe second key function of the law of corporations... [is]
the expost judicial review of the actions of corporate officers and directors, measured by fiduciary pnnciples.");
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1593 (1989)
("Fiduciary duties provide a set of standards to restrain insiders in exercising their discretionary power over the
corporation and its shareholders in contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties
could not contract. Accordingly, parties do not know the decision rule for matters governed by fiduciary duties at
the time that they enter into the corporate contract."); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, 118 HARV. L. REV.2491,
2527 (2005) ("Delaware's primary lawmaking mode is judicial interpretation of fiduciary duties, punctuated by
occasional legislation ...[l]t acts via ex post judicial review of corporate actions, focusing on the fairness and
efficacy of shareholder-board relationships."). The concepts of standards and ex post regulation are distinct,
although closely related.
121. See Gordon, supra note 120, at 1596 ("[T]he content of fiduciary duties is appropriately supplied by
the criterion of fairness ex post[.]").
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ante, rule-based regulation cannot easily provide.
One could argue that fiduciary duties, and other ex post, standards-based regulation,
are inherently unfair in that they do not provide adequate notice to directors of the type of
conduct that could lead to liability. 12 2 However, if we were to eliminate fiduciary duties,
we would need to replace them with laws that serve the same purpose. It would be
extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to develop ex ante rules that would serve that role
adequately. Any such laws would have a stifling effect on the corporation's
entrepreneurialism and competitiveness.
Of course, there is a third alternative. The duty of care could be eliminated and not
replaced with any other law, leaving the decision-making process entirely unregulated.
However, this is not a very viable option. Modem democratic society seems to demand that
those with great power, including corporate management, be held accountable. 123 The
current state of affairs between shareholder rights activists and corporate directors suggests
that many shareholders, at least, are not interested in reducing director accountability any
further. The fact is that directors cannot be trusted enough to be left completely
unaccountable, even if only with respect to the duty of care. This is not because directors
are less trustworthy than others. To the contrary, they are presumably as trustworthy-but
only as trustworthy-as others. There is no basis on which to assume that directors as a
class are people of extraordinary virtue.
Thus, the existence of other law does not provide adequate justification for eliminating
the duty of care. Fiduciary duties generally, and the duty of care in particular, serve a
special role in policing corporate management. The alternative would be an undesirable
increase in legal regulation.
2. Market Forces
Another argument that the duty of care may be unnecessary is that market forces may
be adequate to ensure director diligence. "It is now widely recognized that a variety of
markets-product, employment, capital, and corporate control-constrain inefficient
management performance ..
"124 Moreover, market forces are often considered to be

122 See Kaplow, supra note 119, at 607-08 (describing concerns that standards may fail to provide clear
notice on what is required or forbidden); Schlag, supra note 119, at 385 (distinguishing the pros and cons of rules
and standards).
123. See Frankel, supra note 24, at 717 ("Those who manage and control other peoples' money must be
judicially accountable. It is, therefore, unlikely that the courts will relinquish their authority over directors'
fiduciary duties.").
124. Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824 (1981). See also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
FiduciaryDuties. A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 18-32 (1999) (discussing various
market forces that constrain management conduct); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1288 (1982) ("The discipline exerted by product and capital markets, the market for
managerial services, and the market for corporate control severely limits the divergence of interest between
managers and investors."); Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trnstsforthe Provision of PrivateGoods, 37 EMORY L.J.
295, 303-06, 315 (1988) (arguing that "[c]ompetition in capital markets, product markets, and the market for
corporate control all induce managers and directors of public corporations to act in ways consonant with
shareholder welfare"); Robert B. Thompson, The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L.
377, 380-82 (1990) (describing various market forces that constrain management); Elson & Thompson, supra
note 81, at 580-82 ("Product markets indirectly constrain managers' decisions, as do the capital market, the
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more effective regarding care issues than loyalty issues. 125 "Where incentive mechanisms
created by one part of the corporate structure-the various markets in which the
corporation and its managers function-constrain managerial discretion to perform
inefficiently, one would not expect a different part of that structure to provide redundant
controls."' 126 Thus, perhaps there is no need for a duty of care.
Although there can be no doubt that market forces can have a disciplining effect upon
directors' conduct, the question remains whether the effect is sufficient to justify the
elimination of the duty of care. "It is undoubtedly the case that both liability rules and
market forces are important in constraining the behavior of corporate officials." 127 In fact,
some scholars doubt how effective market forces can be. As Professor Melvin Eisenberg
succinctly argued,
The discipline of product markets is limited by the fact that a corporation may
eam profits and survive for a long period of time despite bad management, just
as it may incur losses or even fail despite good management. The discipline of
the capital market is blunted by the ability of corporations with large cash flows
to meet their capital needs for a long period of time through internal and even
external financing, although profits are lower than good management would
produce. The discipline of the market for corporate control is limited by a number
of elements, including the high transaction costs of takeover bids, the necessity
to offer a premium well in excess of market price, the requirements of relevant
statutes, the defensive techniques available, the incentives to take over efficiently
run as well as inefficiently run companies, and the time lag often experienced by
potential acquirors in ascertaining lack of managerial efficiency. Direct review
by the body of shareholders is seldom an efficacious instrument of accountability
in publicly held corporations because of the disparate and shifting nature of the
shareholder body and the complexity of modem management issues. Oversight
of managers by more senior managers is undoubtedly very effective as to middle
and lower management, but cannot serve to hold accountable the corporation's
128
top management, particularly the chief executive officer.

market for managerial services, and the market for corporate control."); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262-73 (1977) (discussing

constraint on management control created by market forces including stock pnce).
125. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 124, at 408 ("As compared to the law's relative less-effectiveness in
resounding to loyalty concerns, the markets arguably are more likely to affect duty of care violations.").
126. Gilson, supra note 124, at 839. See also Scott, supra note 5, at 936 ("Given this array of monitoring
mechanisms and incentives, the duty of care lawsuit (or its threat) seem of minor importance."); Daniel R. Fischel
& Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261,274-76 (1986) (discussing alternatives to liability rules for assunng

contractual performance).
127. Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standardin Corporate
Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1,5 (1989). See also Bainbndge, supra note 13, at 110 ("It would be naive to
assume that markets fully constrain director behavior."); Rock, supra note 78, at 1011 ("But on examination,
none of these checks, with the exception of competitive product markets, when they exist, seems to provide a
very robust check on managers. Each seems to help a little some of the time, and only occasionally seems to help
a lot.").
128.

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the CorporateLaw Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 582, 583-84 (1985).
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No one would claim that market forces are sufficiently robust to obviate the need for all
law. "In fact, markets may increase pressure on corporate management to breach fiduciary
duties." 12 9 Thus, the question becomes how much law, and what kinds of laws, are
optimal? The proper balance between market forces and legal forces has been debated at
length, and there is no logically correct answer. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe
that market forces are not sufficient to justify the elimination of the duty of care.
First, recent history strongly suggests that market forces are incapable of preventing
corporate misconduct. Whether one considers the securities fraud that occurred in firms
such as Enron and Worldcom at the turn of the century, or the widespread imprudence that
led to the more recent financial collapse, neither market forces nor legal forces-nor even
both operating together-seem to be doing an adequate job. The idea that corporate actors
will regulate themselves out of self-interest is no longer as highly regarded as it used to
be. 130 Even if it could be said that market forces do a better job in the long run, it is
undeniable that additional forces could be helpful to prevent serious dislocations in the
short run.
Second, just as market forces cannot be expected to eliminate the need for law
altogether, they should not be expected to eliminate the need for particular laws. As
discussed earlier, different laws address different concerns. 131 Unless market forces can
eliminate a concern, they cannot eliminate the need for a law that addresses that concern.
At most, market forces and other laws can only reduce the need for enforcement of certain
laws. However, this makes the duty of care a particularly poor candidate for reform,
because it is already being enforced at a very low level.
A third reason to believe that market forces do not limit the need for duty of care is
the fact that people obey the law for reasons other than enforcement. 132 In other words,
even if market forces are sufficiently disciplinary to eliminate the need for the enforcement
of the duty of care, it would not necessarily eliminate the benefits of having a duty of care.
This point will be taken up in greater detail later in this Article. 133 For now, it is worth
noting that, if people obey the law at least in part simply because it is the law and not solely
in order to avoid punishment, then there may be a significant benefit to having a duty of

129. Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1255 (1995). See Helen A.
Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 749 (discussing the dark

side of "market discipline").
130.

See Bloomberg Surveillance, Bloomberg Radio Interview with Arthur Levitt (Dec. 12, 2011), available

at http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/vKxulWif w8.mp3 ("We learned that our oversight mechanism is
deeply flawed ... that oversight by self-regulation is up to severe question. Does self-regulation work? Watching

MF Global, you'd have to say: no, it doesn't work."); Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
Testimony to

Committee

of Government

Oversight and

Reform

(Oct. 23,

2008),

available at

http://web.ntpu.edu.tw/-guan/courses/Greenspan's%20testimony.pdf ("[T]hose of us who have looked to the
self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked
disbelief.");

James

Surowiecki,

Bankers

Gone

Wild,

THE

NEW

YORKER

(July

30,

2012),

www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/07/30/bankers-gone-wild ("[l]f recent history has taught us anything, it's
that self-regulation doesn't work in finance, and that wornes about reputation are a weak deterrent to corporate
malfeasance ").
131. See supra Part 11C.1.
132. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (arguing that people obey the law for
various reasons); LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011)

(same).
133. See infra Part 111.E (discussing the expressive and pedagogical value of law).
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care and requiring directors to be diligent.
Finally, market forces are less likely to operate on directors than officers. Officers
have their lives and careers invested in the company. If market forces destroy the company,
it is the officers who will suffer-not the directors. Independent directors are only parttimers, whose lives and careers are more heavily invested in other companies. 134 Thus,
market forces are considerably weaker with respect to directors. And yet, directors play a
very important role in corporate governance-one that is very different than that played by
officers. We want and need directors to be diligent. Thus, it is unlikely that market forces
eliminate the need for the duty of care.
In short, whether the disciplinary effect of market forces can eliminate the need for
particular laws is an empirical question that is not within the scope of this paper. However,
market forces cannot eliminate the need for all law. There are good reasons to believe that
they do not eliminate the need for a duty of care.
D. Not Fiduciary
The fourth line of argument would be that, even if there must be a duty of care, it need
not be considered a fiduciary duty. It might better be considered a contractual duty or a tort
duty, but it is not truly fiduciary in nature. This Section will defend the corporate law duty
of care against such arguments.
1. ContractualDuty
It is possible to conceive of the duty of care as a mere contractual duty. 135 In brief,
the argument runs as follows: Because the director's relationship to the corporation is
consensual, the duties of that relationship should be governed by agreement. However,
parties to a long-term relationship cannot efficiently specify all the terms and obligations
of the relationship. To facilitate transactions, the law provides implied terms to fill in the
gaps. These implied terms are merely default rules and should always give way to the
explicit agreement of the parties. Thus, the parties to the relationship should be permitted
to choose how rigorous the duty of care should be. If they are able to do this, then the duty
of care is contractual in nature.
Scholars have considered the merits of the argument extensively, on both a descriptive
and normative level. 136 Inevitably, the debate draws on various issues considered

134.

See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent DirectorModel Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 789

(2014) ("Independent directors are part-time participants in a corporation's affairs. By definition, they are
outsiders. However intelligent, hardworking, or strong minded they may be, they do not have the time or the
mandate to challenge management's judgments except as to a discrete number of issues.").
135. See, e.g, Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractand FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 427 (1993) ("Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of
obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings."); Larry E. Ribstem, Are
PartnersFiduciaries?,2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215 (2005) ("Fiduciary duties are a type of contract term[.]").

136. See, e.g, Frankel, supra note 129 (arguing against the contractarian definition of fiduciary duties);
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879 (arguing it is
erroneous to equate fiduciary obligations with contract law); Scott FitzGibbon, FiduciaryRelationships Are Not
Contracts,82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999) (identifying differences between fiduciary relationships and contractual
relationships); Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451

(2006) (arguing the duty of loyalty is an important feature of fiduciary relationships, and framing it as a
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throughout this entire Article. 1 3 7 In this Section, I will limit the discussion to the question
of whether the contractarian argument, as such, provides support for the elimination of the
duty of care in particular.
One noteworthy aspect of the contractarian argument is that its logic applies equally
well to the duty of loyalty. 13 8 Simply put, it is actually an argument that all fiduciary duties
are contractual terms rather than law. Most scholars seem to find the argument more
persuasive with respect to the duty of care than the duty of loyalty. 139 However, this is
generally not an evaluation of the merits of the contractarian argument itself; rather, it tends
to be an assessment on the relative need for enforcement. The contractarian argument, in
its pure form, applies to both duties equally and denies any special legal significance to
fiduciary duties. 14 0 Thus, the argument proves too much, at least for present purposes. It is
ultimately irrelevant on the issue of whether the duty of care should be considered as much
a fiduciary duty as the duty of loyalty.
Are fiduciary duties legal or merely contractual in nature? At a high enough level of
abstraction,

the difference

between

the two perspectives

can

seem to fade

into

insignificance. On the one hand, fiduciary law is perfectly capable of accommodating nonmandatory obligations. Fiduciary law scholars readily acknowledge that, under certain
circumstances, shareholders should be permitted to waive at least some fiduciary duties. 141
Generally, they simply want to put in place sufficient safeguards to ensure that the waiver
is informed and voluntary 14 2 (although in certain cases or extreme circumstances, they may
want to reserve the right to prevent or disregard a waiver). 14 3 On the other hand,
contractarian theory can and must accommodate mandatory terms. 14 4 For example, all

contractual relationships would weaken important protections). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989)
(explaining shortcomings of the contractanan view).
137. In particular, proponents of the contractarian argument tend to rely on the disciplinary effect of market
forces to argue against the duty of care. See supra Part II.C.2.
138. Easterbrook & Fischel, supranote 135, at 426 ("[T]he duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility
of writing contracts completely specifying the parties' obligations.").
139. See supra notes 74-75, 95 97 and accompanying text.
140. If the contractarian argument is correct, then both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are merely
default rules. By contrast, if the argument is wrong, then both are legal duties. However, considering fiduciary
duties to be law does not require that they be entirely mandatory, because they could be waivable duties, or simply
repealed.
141. See, eg., Frankel, supra note 129, at 1231 ("There are good reasons for viewing fiduciary rules as
default rules and for enforcing the parties' bargain around them."); Coffee, supranote 136, at 1690 ("[T]here is
a middle ground. courts can tolerate and monitor some departures in this area, much as they have done in other
forms of contracting. The relevant task for the future then should be to define the area of tolerable departures,
rather than to prolong the holy war over opting out.").
142. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 129, at 1230 ("Even if fiduciaries may make such requests [i.e., for a
waiver of a duty], the nature of the relationship requires that the parties follow a unique procedure when they
bargain around these duties[j"); Coffee, supranote 136, at 1624 ("[D]epartures from the default rules of fiduciary
duty must be sufficiently specific and bounded to permit the departure to be accurately priced.").
143. See, eg., Frankel, supra note 129, at 1214 ("[C]ircumstances exist where fiduciary duties are not
waivable for reasons such as doubts about the quality of the entrustors' consent (especially when given by public
entrustors such as shareholders), and the need to preserve institutions in society that are based on trust."); Coffee,
supra note 136, at 1624 ("Beyond [a] mandatory minimum, the parties are free to contract around those fiduciary
norms that require selflessness, but not around those that seek to prevent fraud and opportunism.").
144. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel,supra note 135, at 429 ("[L]egislatures often create nonwaivable rules.
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contracts are subject to laws of general applicability that prohibit or compel certain
behavior. In addition, contract law itself has many mandatory rules. Ultimately, any law
could be understood as a mandatory contractual term, and fiduciary duties could be counted
among them.
I do not mean to suggest that the difference between law and contract is irrelevant. To
the contrary, it can be very important when dealing with particular issues. 145 My point is
simply that either concept can be subsumed by the other when considered at a sufficiently
general level. Therefore, the extent to which fiduciary duties generally (and the duty of
care in particular) should be mandatory is a policy question that depends upon other factors.
The label "contract" (or "law" for that matter) does not have talismanic significance.
The corporate law duty of care already does, to a large extent, operate contractually.
In states such as Delaware, a corporation can choose whether to amend its charter to
eliminate directors' personal liability for breach of the duty of care-but not of the duty of
loyalty. 146 To be fair, such an option is not perfectly contractual: it does not empower the
parties to determine the exact level of care they would like, but only allows for a limited
set of options. There does not seem to be flexibility to impose a higher standard, such as
47
ordinary negligence, 1 nor a lower standard, such as the elimination of injunctive relief 148
However, there is not much of a public outcry for either option. On the bottom-line question
of whether or not there should be personal liability for breach, the corporate law duty of
care is largely contractual (while the duty of loyalty is not). However, the contractarian
argument logically cannot support the elimination of the duty of care-or of any duty.
Contractarians should be as opposed to the elimination of the duty of care as they are to its
imposition.
Ultimately, the contractual argument for the elimination of the duty of care in
particular is not very strong. The contractarian issue with the duty of care has nothing to
do with the substance of the duty, and everything to do with its mandatory imposition by
law. As such, it is really an argument against fiduciary duties generally, not against the
duty of care specifically.
2. Tort Duty
It is also possible to consider the duty of care to be a tort duty. 14 9 After all, care and

• . . [M]any of these rules in corporate and securities laws, even seemingly rigid ones, are best understood as
implicit contractual terms."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1428 (1989) ("Even terms that are invariant-such as the requirement that the board of directors act
only by a majority of a quorum-are contractual to the extent that they produce offsetting voluntary
arrangements.").
145. 1agree with Tamar Frankel, who argues that "in terms of both psychological fact and organization of
the law, a name is important and reclassification can be treacherous." Frankel, supra note 129, at 1211.
146. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014).
147. It is not entirely clear whether shareholders could impose a higher standard of care. However, there
does not seem to be any real demand for a higher standard.
148. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1139, 1139 (2012) (arguing that "[f]iduciary duty in corporation law rests on a tort foundation");
Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of FiduciaryDuty: On JustifiableExpectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences,
48 ARIZ. L. REv. 925, 927-34 (2006) (discussing breach of fiduciary duty as a tort action); William A. Gregory,
The FiduciaryDuty of Care-A Perversionof Words, 38 AKRON L. REv. 181, 188-89 (2005) ("A duty of care
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negligence are the hallmarks of tort law: everyone has the duty (of a reasonable person
under the circumstances) not to create unreasonable risks of harm to others. 150 Moreover,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts manages to fit breach of fiduciary duty within its
scope. 151 Perhaps the corporate law duty of care is not a fiduciary duty at all but merely a
tort law duty.
The main problem with this argument is that the effect would not be to eliminate the
corporate law duty of care, or even weaken it, but rather to strengthen it. That is because
in tort law, unlike corporate law, there is no divergence between standards of conduct and
standards of review. 152 The standard of conduct is ordinary care, and the standard of review
is negligence-the two are opposite sides of the same coin. If this principle were to be
applied to the corporate law duty of care, then the standard of review would be raised from
gross negligence 153 to ordinary negligence. In other words, a tort law foundation would
more likely lead to the evisceration of the business judgment rule than the elimination of
the duty of care.
Professor Robert Rhee has argued that "the liability scheme of corporate boards under
the doctrines of fiduciary duty and the business judgment rule can be understood through
the analytics of torts." 154 He claims that tort law principles should lead to essentially the
same liability scheme as is currently enjoyed by directors because various tort law doctrines
would be contextually sensitive to the needs of corporate law. Rhee does not argue that the
corporate law duty of care is a tort duty; he only argues that it could be. 155 His analysis,
claim is always a tort action and is always based on negligence. A duty of care claim can never be a breach of
fiduciary duty."). But see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder,89 TEX.L. REV. 1293, 1327 (2011) ("As a conceptual matter, it is also pretty clear that breaches of
fiduciary duties are not torts, at least not in the common law use of that term, although they may be 'civil
wrongs."'); Charles Hansen, The ALl CorporateGovernance Project. Ofthe Duty of Due Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW. 1237, 1241 (1986) ("A careful reading of the cases illustrates the
substantial difference between applying the due care test in tort law and the standard actually employed by the
courts in reaching decisions under corporate law.").
150. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 398 (2d ed. 2011) ("The duty owed by all
people generally-the standard of care-is the duty to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable
and prudent person under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to others.").
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) ("One standing in a fiduciary relation with another
is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation."). Two points
are worth making regarding the Restatement. First, it does not purport to provide a comprehensive theory of
fiduciary duty. It merely claims that "the action [for breach of fiduciary duty] may properly be regarded as in tort
for damages, being an equitable tort even when the action is in the traditional scope of equitable jurisdiction." Id
at Reporter's Note. The Restatement even acknowledges that "Some fiduciary relations, such as those of...
director and corporation are the subject of a considerable group of substantive rules . . . governing the
relationship." Id. Second, the Restatement's claim is not limited to the duty of care but extends to all of fiduciary
duties. Thus, it does not provide support for the claim that the duty of care is a mere tort duty while the duty of
loyalty remains a fiduciary duty.
152. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supranote 11, at 437 ("In many or most areas of law, these two kinds of standards
tend to be conflated."); Rhee, supranote 149, at1153 ("In other fields of law such as tort law, the standards of
conduct and review conflate to a single standard for the purpose of judicial review."); Velasco, supra note 4, at
521 ("In many areas of law, the two types of standards coincide. For example, in tort law, the standard of conduct
is ordinary care, and the standard of review is negligence, which is generally defined as the lack of ordinary
care.").
153. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
154. Rhee,supranote 149, at 1142
155. See id. ("To be clear, I do not argue that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort[.]").
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however, represents-at most-an account of how tort law could be massaged to reach
those results. It seems unlikely that the law actually would develop in that way.
Contextual sensitivity might very well lead tort law to an interpretation of negligence
that, in the corporate law context, is more deferential than usual. However, corporate law
only
currently provides for (almost) no review of the substance of business decisions, and 156
It
standard.
negligence
gross
a
under
process
decision-making
limited review of the
of
strains credulity to believe that tort law would ever get anywhere near that level
deference through a logical application of existing principles. The probable end result
would be that directors would be held to a much stricter standard of care than they currently
are.
Of course, courts could reposition the duty of care in tort law and simply adopt the
deference of the business judgment rule as well. By this point, however, one has to wonder
what the purpose would be. The corporate law duty of care should be considered a tort law
duty rather than a fiduciary duty only if general principles of tort law provide a more useful
framework for its application than do general principles of fiduciary law. They do not.
Forcing the issue is possible, but unnecessary, and likely to be counterproductive in the
long run.
Another reason why tort law is an unlikely home for the corporate law duty of care is
because the two have divergent goals. Tort law, to a large extent, focuses on the
compensation of injured parties. 157 The corporate law duty of care does not. To some
extent, the duty of care may allow for compensation to flow to shareholders, but only
incidentally. The goal of the corporate law duty of care, like all other fiduciary duties, is to
protect shareholders from abuse at the hands of managers. 15 8 Compensation is merely one
possible means to achieve this goal, and it does not play a very large role in corporate law.
Both the business judgment rule and exculpation provisions severely limit the availability
of damages for breaches of the duty of care, demonstrating that compensation is a
secondary concern, at best, in the corporate law context. Thus, tort law and the corporate
159
law duty of care simply do not have enough in common.
Although the corporate law duty of care could be considered a tort law duty, it should
not be. The fit simply isn't there. As we will see, the duty of care fits very nicely within
the framework of fiduciary law and theory.
3. Distinctiveness
Another argument that the duty of care is not a fiduciary duty is that care is not
distinctively fiduciary. 160 If care is not distinctively fiduciary, then perhaps it ought not be

156. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing the business judgment rule).
157. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 150, at § I ("Tort law is pnmarily intended to redress legally recognized
harms by rendering a money judgment against the wrongdoer.").
158. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
159. Although both tort law and the corporate law duty of care may share the secondary goal of deterrence,
that is not a sufficient foundation upon which to build. Almost all law has deterrence as a goal.
160. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of FiduciaryDuty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1406-07, 1409 (2002) ("In short, the duty of care is 'not distinctively fiduciary."'); DeMott, supra note 136, at
915 ("That duty [of care], however, is not distinctively fiduciary .... "); MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY
LOYALTY 35-39 (2010) ("The duty of care is not peculiar to fiduciaries and so 'is not to be equated with or termed
a "fiduciary" duty."').
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lumped together with the duty of loyalty, which clearly is distinctively fiduciary. This
section will respond to that argument and insist that the corporate law duty of care ought
to be considered a fiduciary duty because it is inherently fiduciary in nature.
a. Distinctively Fiduciary?
It seems difficult to argue that the duty of care is distinctively fiduciary. This is
because the duty of care also exists in other areas of law, such as tort law and criminal law.
By contrast, the duty of loyalty does not. Loyalty is unique to fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary
relations. To argue that the duty of care is distinctively fiduciary, one would have to
establish that there is something distinctive about the fiduciary duty of care as compared
to other duties of care.
The ideal argument would be that the fiduciary duty of care demands more than other
duties of care. Fiduciary relations are special relations of trust that demand utmost good
faith from fiduciaries. One might reasonably expect a heightened duty of care. However,
one would be disappointed. It is true that "[s]ome courts have articulated the standard to
be that of ordinarily prudent persons acting under similar circumstances in the conduct of
their own affairs." 1 6 1 Arguably, this is not ordinary care. 162 It is more than what would be
expected of a simple agent; it requires directors to act as if their own fortunes were at stake.
Given the rational assumption that people care more about their own fortunes than those
of others, this could be considered a very high standard. In fact, it would seem to parallel
the duty of loyalty in that it requires a form of selflessness. Arguably, it is the highest
standard of care that could be required of anyone. Thus, it would be distinctively fiduciary.
Unfortunately for that thesis, most states do not articulate their duty of care in that
way. Delaware, for example, articulates the duty of care in a way that seems less
demanding: it requires that directors "use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances."' 163 Similarly, the Model Business
Corporation Act requires the directors to act "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." 164 Thus, it is difficult to

161.

Bradley & Schipani, supra note 127, at 18 & n. 105. See also Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d

270, 278 (Alaska 1980) ("No proof was presented that the alleged acts were unreasonable in the sense that they
would not have been taken by 'an ordinarily prudent man . . in the management of his own affairs of like
magnitude and importance."'); Weidner v. Engelhart, 176 N.W.2d 509, 518 (N.D. 1970) ("The better rule appears
to be that a director is bound to exercise, in the performance of the functions of his position, such care as a prudent
man should exercise in like circumstances and charged with a like duty, which care is usually, but not necessarily,
that which such a person would show in the conduct of his own affairs of a similar kind."); Hom Silver Min.Co.
v. Ryan, 44 N.W. 56, 56 (Minn. 1889) ("The measure of care and diligence required of directors is generally held
to be such as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs."); Besselieu v. Brown, 97 S.E. 743, 744 (N.C. 1919)
("[Tihe directors and managing officers of a corporation ... are expected and required to give.., the care and
attention that a prudent man should exercise in like circumstances and charged with a like duty, usually the care
that he shows in the conduct of his own affairs of a similar kind").
162. See, e.g., William L. Cary & Sam Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day
Statutes and the Model Act, 27 BuS. LAw. 61, 63 (1972) (discussing Pennsylvania's history of using such

terminology).
163. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del 1963). See generally 1 EDWARD P.
WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.02[A][1], at 4-27 to -28 (6th ed.

2014) (explaining the duty of care).
164. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(3).
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defend the claim that the corporate law duty of care creates a heightened duty.
Ironically, the argument becomes significantly stronger when reversed. The corporate
law duty of care can be said to be distinctively fiduciary not because it is a heightened duty
but because it is underenforced. As previously discussed, corporate law is characterized by
a divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review, while most other areas
of law are not. If the duty of care were not a fiduciary duty, a negligence standard would
be enforced; however, only a gross negligence standard is enforced. This makes the
corporate law duty of care distinctive.
This argument may seem counterintuitive, but it makes sense. It is because the duty
of care is a fiduciary duty that corporate law permits the duty of care to be underenforced.
The divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review is based upon
fiduciary considerations. 165 First, directors are trusted to act in the shareholders' interests
when they are not conflicted. 166 Second, minimal enforcement is instrumentally desirable
because it allows directors to pursue the interests of the shareholders without fear of
personal liability. 167 Without these deeply and distinctively fiduciary considerations, the
divergence would be difficult to justify. Thus, it is fair to say that the duty of care is
distinctively fiduciary because it is underenforced.
Two other arguments concerning the distinctiveness of the corporate law duty of care
can be raised, and they are more straightforward and less controversial. The first is that the
corporate law duty of care necessarily requires affirmative action while the tort and
criminal law duties typically do not. Tort law and criminal law may require actors to be
careful if they choose to act, but generally they do not require people to act in the first
place.16 8 Except under special circumstance, a person will not commit a tort or crime by
staying home and relaxing. However, the corporate law duty of care affirmatively requires
action on the part of fiduciaries. Staying home and doing nothing is a breach of the
corporate law duty of care. This makes the duty distinctively fiduciary.
A second argument about the distinctiveness of the corporate law duty of care can be
made based on the remedies available. In other contexts, the duty of care is a legal duty,
and the remedy is limited to compensation in the form of damages. In corporate law,
however, the duty of care is an equitable duty. As such, it is open to equitable relief 169
Thus, it is distinctively fiduciary.
An equitable remedy is not only available, but actually reasonable in the corporate
law context-possibly even superior to a legal remedy. In the face of corporate negligence
(whether gross negligence or otherwise), an award of damages is often impractical. 170 An

165. See Joseph Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project: The Rule, The Doctrine, The Reality, 52 GEO. WASH L. REV. 609, 610 (1984) ("Although not often
described as such, the business judgment rule basically is an equitable concept."); Velasco, supra note 4, at 54653 ("The divergence is a powerful tool that allows directors to pursue the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders aggressively.").
166. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
168. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 150, at § 405 ("Absent special relationships or particular circumstances
or actions, a defendant is not liable in tort for a pure failure to act for the plaintiffs benefit."); I WAYNE LAFAVE,
SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.2 (2d ed. 2003) ("Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when
that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.").
169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (citing sources).
170. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing impracticability of damages awards for breach
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injunction against the transaction that was wrongly approved, however, often would make
perfect sense. Thus, the corporate law duty of care is more naturally suited to equitable
remedies than legal remedies. As such, it is distinctively fiduciary.
b. Inherently Fiduciary
A more fundamental consideration is that there is no reason to believe that the duty of
care should have to be distinctively fiduciary in order to be considered a fiduciary duty.
Distinctiveness is not generally a requirement for proper categorization. The duty of care
may not be distinctively fiduciary, but neither is it distinctively tort or criminal in nature.
Care may very well be a universal duty that is not distinctively anything. The lack of
distinctiveness does not mean that care is not truly fiduciary, anymore than it means that it
is not truly tort or criminal in nature. Distinctiveness is irrelevant. The appropriate question
to ask is whether the duty of care is inherentlyfiduciary in nature. As long as it is inherently
fiduciary in nature, it is appropriate for consideration alongside any other fiduciary duties,
including the duty of loyalty.
The duty of care is inherently fiduciary in nature. Fiduciary relationships are special
relationships of trust. The basic principle of fiduciary law is that fiduciaries are required to
act solely in the interests of the beneficiary. "[T]he raison d'6tre of fiduciary duties ... is
the protection of the beneficiary from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary" 17 1-with abuse
meaning any failure by the fiduciary to pursue the interests of the beneficiary. 17 2 The duty
of loyalty does this by preventing directors from acting with a conflict of interest. Thus,
directors must pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders loyally. The duty
of care does this by requiring the directors to act with diligence and by preventing them
from acting negligently. Thus, directors must pursue the interest of the corporation and its
shareholders carefully.17 3 Although there are differences between loyalty and care, both
are inherently fiduciary in nature because both are geared towards ensuring that the
directors act in the interest of the corporation and its shareholders. Their fundamental
purpose is the same; they merely address different issues leading towards the same goal.
174
Thus, they are both properly considered fiduciary duties.
c. Conflation
In a recent article, Professor Christopher Bruner has argued that considering the duty
of care to be a fiduciary duty is not "inevitable," but rather "a choice," 175 and that "styling
care a 'fiduciary' duty has in fact impacted the evolution of Delaware's [law] in ways that
are not uniformly positive." 1 76 According to him, "[c]onflation of these differing
of the duty of care in public corporations).
171. See Julian Velasco, FiduciaryDuties and FiduciaryOuts, 21 GEO. MASON L REV. 157, 159 (2013).
172. Cf Paul Miller, The FiduciaryRelationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 63,
75 (Andrew Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) ("[F]iduciary duties ensure that fiduciary powers are exercised in
a manner consistent with the beneficiary's exclusive claim relative to them"). As I use the term, "abuse" includes
acts of omission (e.g., gross negligence) as well as acts of commission (e.g., unfair self-dealing).
173. See Velasco, supranote 23, at 1301.
174. Cf Miller, supra note 172, at 75 ("[F]iduciary duties ensure that fiduciary powers are exercised in a
manner consistent with the beneficiary's exclusive claim relative to them.")
175. Bruner, supra note 57, at 1038.
176. id at 1029.
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circumstances and problems [i.e., care and loyalty] as 'fiduciary duties' (plural) or as twin
reflections of a 'fiduciary' concept (singular) has resulted in a tendency toward
overenforcement of the corporate director's duty of care ... [and] threatens to facilitate the
erosion of the corporate director's duty of loyalty[.]" 177 Thus, even if the duty of care could
be considered a fiduciary duty, perhaps it should not.
Bruner's argument may be criticized in a number of respects. In the first place, there
has been no meaningful "tendency toward over enforcement of the director's duty of
care." 178 Bruner sees this tendency by describing the development of the duty of care as
follows:
[T]he evolution of Delaware's convoluted framework for evaluating
disinterested board conduct-involv[es] an articulation of a duty of care, which
was effectively negated by the business judgment rule, revived by the 'gross
negligence' standard for overcoming the business judgment rule, then negated
again by statutory exception, yet potentially revived again by statutory
exceptions to exculpation .... 179
The exception to exculpation to which he refers is the "good faith" exception, which "led
to a long and tortured debate over the scope of the 'good faith' concept," and which "was
not laid to rest until 2006, when Stone v. Ritter . . . [adopted] the exacting Caremark

standard[.]" 180 It is not surprising that Bruner would claim that the duty of care "has, since
the 1980s, continually grown by accretion, piling complexity upon complexity." 18 1 The
182
back and forth development that he observes can only be "described as vacillation."
However, his is not the only possible account of the development of the duty of care.
A simpler account would be that the duty of care has always been underenforced, with the
exception of one major case that was quickly repudiated by legislation. 183 Under this
account, there is neither complexity nor vacillation. More importantly, there is no
"tendency toward over enforcement of the corporate director's duty of care." 184 There is
only one case that was wrongly decided. 185 Such a track record could compare favorably
with just about any legal doctrine.
Notably, Bruner's account of the development of the duty of care includes the
development of the "'good faith' concept." This inclusion materially adds to the
complexity he observes. However, the inclusion is misguided because the duty of good
faith is not the duty of care. 186 The duty of good faith has alternatively been described as
177.

Id.

178. Id. As discussed in Part II.A, enforcement of the duty of care historically has been very limited. It is
difficult to characterize this as over enforcement-unless, perhaps, one believes that no enforcement is
appropriate. In any event, I take Bruner to be suggesting that the duty of care provides a "penodic[] threat[]" of
overenforcement. Id. at 1029. I reject this characterization in the text that follows.
179. Bruner, supra note 57, at 1028.
180. Id. at 1031.
181.

Id.

182. Id. at 1032.
183. See supra note 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Van Gorkom case).
184. Bruner, supra note 57, at 1029.
185. Of course, there may be other cases that were wrongly decided. However, none were as notorious, or
significant, as the Van Gorkom case. See supra note 91.
186. Bruner is on to something here. As I will argue, it is possible to view the duty of good faith
developments as a revival of the duty of care. See infra Part IV.C.
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one of triads of fiduciary duty 187 and as a subset of the duty of loyalty, 188 but generally
not as part of the duty of care. 189 Contrary to Bruner's account, the duty of care has
remained remarkably consistent over time-consistently underenforced.
In addition, it is unfair to put any blame for "the erosion of the corporate director's
duty of loyalty..."190 on the duty of care. That there has been erosion is undeniable. It is
evident not only "in noncorporate settings," as Bruner acknowledges,191 but in corporate
law as well. As Professor Harold Marsh demonstrated long ago, the duty of loyalty has
been suffering erosion for well over a century. 192 This long predates the duty of care
developments of the 1980s that Bruner criticizes. It also predates "the ascendance of the
'law and economics' movement" that concerns Bruner. 193 For better or for worse, the
erosion of the duty of loyalty simply seems to be a trend in business law. 194 Bruner does
little to demonstrate that the duty of care is to blame, or that it has "fuel[ed] the
contractarian argument."1 95 In fact, given the underlying commitments of the contractarian
view, it seems difficult to maintain that the duty of loyalty could have escaped its notice if
only there were no duty of care.
Bruner goes on to attribute the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in the Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor case 196 to the conflation of the duty of care with the duty of loyalty. As
Bruner describes that opinion,
the Cede court fully subsumed the duties of care and loyalty within the BJR,
depicting the BJR itself as the primary embodiment of the rigors of "fiduciary"
status, with care and loyalty alike relegated to secondary status as mere
reflections of the BJR. The court lumped together "good faith, loyalty [and] due
care" as means of overcoming the BJR, clearly conceptualizing these duties as
expressions of a fundamental and singular fiduciary concept embodied more
97
holistically by the BJR itself. 1
The Cede case has been widely criticized along these lines.1 98 Bruner is correct that the
Cede case was a huge mistake. However, it is important to note that the fault does not lie
at the foot of the duty of care. The problem was that the court was being too creative for
its own good. The court forced fiduciary duties into the business judgment rule, when the

187. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (describing the triads of fiduciary
duty as "good faith, loyalty [and] due care").
188. See Stone ex. rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (describing

the requirement to act in good faith as a subsidiary element of the duty of loyalty).
189.

But see infra notes 338-341 and accompanying text (arguing that the Caremark case was actually a

duty of care case).
190.

Bruner, supra note 57, at 1029.

191.

Id.

192. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966) (surveying the history and
breakdown of the duty of loyalty).

193. Bruner, supra note 57, at 1048.
194. For one possible explanation for why this may have occurred, see Rock & Wachter, supra note 59, at
668-71.
195.
196.

Bruner, supra note 57, at 1029.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).

197.

Bruner, supra note 57, at 1040 (citations omitted).

198.

See, e.g., Johnson, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 802-03; Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1302-03; Velasco,

supra note 23, at 1305-14.
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business judgment rule might better be considered a mere standard of review. 199 The court
also applied the entire fairness test to all breaches of fiduciary duty, when the test was
clearly developed for, and only works well in, duty of loyalty cases. 20 0 In doing all of this,
the court was creating an entirely new model for the enforcement of fiduciary duties, even
though there was no need to do so.
Bruner argues that none of this would have been possible "had care not been
conceptualized ['as a 'fiduciary' duty']."' 20 1 However, the same could be said for the duty
of loyalty: Cede would not have been possible had the court dispensed with fiduciary duties
altogether, as contractarians might prefer. The relevant question is not one of "but for"
causation, but rather of proximate causation: is either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty
to blame for these developments? The answer is no on both fronts. The Cede approach does
not logically flow from either concept. Nor does it flow from the multiplicity of fiduciary
duties: the traditional model of fiduciary duties had applied the business judgment rule to
duty of care issues and the entire fairness test to duty of loyalty issues. 20 2 The Cede
approach was a novel development, and it was a mistake. It is similar to the mistake that
the Delaware Supreme Court made in Stone v. Ritter,203 where it demoted the duty of good
faith and made it a subset of the duty of loyalty, even though, as I have argued elsewhere,
the two have almost nothing to do with each other.204 That the court may make mistakes
while theorizing about the nature of a law is unfortunate, but not a good reason to eliminate
the law.
In any event, the holding of Cede may not be as bad, as a practical matter, as it appears.
In other work, I have argued that it was a mistake without much consequence. 20 5 Even
under the Cede framework, the business judgment rule tends to protect duty of care cases,
and the entire fairness test tends to be used to evaluate duty of loyalty cases. Perhaps the
most significant aspect of the case was it ultimate resolution: directors were not held liable
despite gross negligence because the transaction was nevertheless entirely fair. 20 6 The
effect of the holding was to erode the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the decision to consider the duty of care to be
a fiduciary duty has caused any harm to the development of the law of fiduciary duties.
Despite Bruner's claims, there has been no tendency to overenforce the duty of care, and
the erosion of the duty of loyalty has been a trend that predates the modem duty of care.
Although there have been a few bad cases here and there, this is unavoidable. However,
there has been nothing that would warrant any demotion of the duty of care.

199.

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing the business judgment rule as a standard of

review).

200. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1302-03 (noting that the court offered no explanation for why
duty of care claims should be subjected to the same standard of review that applies to duty of loyalty claims);
Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 585 (2008).
201.
202.
203.

Bruner, supra note 57, at 1043. See also id. at 1042.
See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1306-07.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).

204. See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1252; see also Bainbridge et al., supra note 200, at 604 ("[WIhile the
Delaware Supreme Court [in Stone] seemingly set out to solve some doctrinal puzzles, in doing so it made things
worse in many respects.").
205. See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1307.
206.

Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995).
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III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR

The fact that the courts recognize a fiduciary duty of care in corporate law is beyond
question. Whether they should continue to do so, however, is a normative question that is
not beyond dispute. The previous part considered arguments against the duty of care. It
concluded that the various arguments provide good reasons not to enforce the duty of care
very strictly, but they do not go so far as to establish that the duty of care should be entirely
unenforceable, much less eliminated altogether. This Part will consider arguments in favor
of the duty of care.
This Part will begin with the straightforward arguments that the duty of care is wellestablished in corporate law, and that it can have a deterrent effect on director misconduct.
It will then argue that the duty of care is necessary because of two major shortcomings in
the duty of loyalty. First, the duty of loyalty is itself underenforced, and therefore cannot
adequately police fiduciary relationships on its own. Second, the concept of loyalty is
inadequate to capture the essence of the fiduciary relation. Finally, this Part will argue that
the duty of care serves an important expressive function of telling directors what the law
demands of them. This function is undermined, however, if there is not at least a possibility
of enforcement.
A. Pedigree
One argument in favor of the duty of care is that it is well-established in corporate
law. Admittedly, this argument is of limited value. The fact that something is-and even
that it long has been-does not establish that it ought to be, or should not be reconsidered.
Nevertheless, if this is how corporate law has developed, and there is no urgent reason to
make a change, 20 7 then some might consider the duty of care's pedigree to be an argument
for leaving well enough alone.
Although it is clear that the courts do recognize a duty of care in corporate law, one
might question how well established the duty really is. As evidence, a skeptic might cite
the work of Henry Ridgely Horsey, 208 the Delaware Supreme Court Justice who famously
20 9
authored perhaps the most significant duty of care case of all time, Smith v. Van Gorkom.
Disappointed by his research, 2 10 he concluded that "no Delaware court decision espouses
the existence of a director's fiduciary duty to act in an informed manner and with the care
of a prudent man until the decision of our separately constituted supreme court in 1963 in
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.''2 11 Thus, it could be argued, the duty of
care is of fairly recent origin and does not deserve too much respect and deference.
Horsey's claim, however reluctantly made, must be evaluated critically. First, it
should be noted that this would make the duty of care over 50 years old now-no longer
as young as it was when Horsey wrote. Moreover, its age should be put into context:

207. See infra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
208. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component ofthe Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 971 (1994).
209. Smith v Van Gorkon, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
210. See Horsey, supra note 208, at 981 ("My findings on this aspect of Delaware corporate decisional law
were ...disappointing[.]").
211. Id.at 982-83.
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Delaware did not enact its first general incorporation law until 1875,212 and did not obtain
the position of prominence until after New Jersey's misstep in 1913.213 Thus, the duty of
care has been clearly established for a significant portion of the life of Delaware corporate
law. Furthermore, the claim is simply wrong. In 1961, for example, the Delaware Court of
Chancery held non-affiliated directors liable for their gross negligence in the case of Lutz
2 14
v. Boas.
In his research, Horsey was looking for the duty of care in haec verbae.2 15 However,
the duty of care may not always be referred to by name. That is likely why he overlooked
the Lutz case; the opinion never used the terms "duty of care"-or even "care" or "business
judgment." Instead, it spoke of gross negligence and various failings. Nevertheless, it is a
duty of care case.
Likewise, this insistence upon particular formulations causes Horsey, and others, to
downplay the significance of other cases. Horsey even quotes the following passage from
the 1926 case of Bodell v. GeneralGas & Electric Corp.,2 16 but downplays its significance:
It is not always necessary for [the directors] to reap a personal profit or gain a
personal advantage in order for their actions in performance of their quasi trust
to be successfully questioned. Trustees owe not alone the duty to refrain from
profiting themselves at the expense of their beneficiaries. They owe the duty of
2
saving their beneficiaries from loss. 17
This is a fairly clear, albeit not explicit, statement that directors owe not only a duty of
loyalty, but also a duty of care. Similar statements can be found in early Delaware cases,
such as Guth v. Loft. 2 18 That these cases did not lead to liability for breach of the duty of
care is not important because the issue is not the enforceability of the duty of care-that is
a separate question-but only its existence.
Once consideration is extended beyond Delaware, it becomes abundantly clear that
the corporate law duty of care existed long before the 20th century. The United States
Supreme Court, for example, recognized a duty of care in 1891 in the case of Briggs v.
Spaulding.2 19 The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the duty of care as far back as
1829, in the case of Percy v. Millaudon.220 And in England, it was recognized as far back

212.

See Andrew G.T. Moore II, A BriefHistory of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware

and the Amendment Process, in I R FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF

CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, H-1 at H-3 (3d ed. 1999 Supp.); Samuel Arsht, A History of
Delaware CorporationLaw, I DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1976); William E Kirk, 111,A Case Study in Legislative
Opportunism- How Delaware Used the Federal-State System to Attain CorporatePre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L.
233, 250 (1984).
213. See Moore, supra note 212, at H-8; Kirk, supra note 212, at 257-58.
214. Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395 (Del. Ch. 1961). The case may not be the model duty of care case
because it involves both a financial institutional and some loyalty issues. However, non-affiliated directors were
held liable for their gross negligence.
215. See Horsey, supranote 208, at 981.
216. Bodell v Gen Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926).
217. Id at 447, quoted in Horsey, supranote 208, at 982.
218. Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); see infra notes 300-01 and
accompanying text.
219. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
220. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
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as 1742, in CharitableCorp. v. Sutton. 22 1 Considering that the modem corporation is itself
not very old, it becomes clear that the duty of care has deep roots in corporate law after all.
Thus, although too much should not be made of the point, it is fair to say that the duty
of care is well-established. Corporate law has developed on the assumption that there is a
duty of care as well as a duty of loyalty. If we are to reconsider this development, we should
do so cautiously and for good reasons.
B. Deterrence
An enforceable duty of care is based primarily on a liability regime: shareholders can
sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty (albeit in derivative actions), and directors may
be held liable for damages. Perhaps the two most obvious benefits of a liability regime are
compensation
and
deterrence:
compensation
of the
injured
party
(the
shareholder/beneficiary),
and deterrence
of misconduct by the actor (the
director/fiduciary). Although both of these benefits may be applicable to the corporate law
duty of care, the situation is admittedly complicated.
With respect to compensation, the situation is too complicated to warrant its inclusion
as an argument in favor of the duty of care. 2 22 In the abstract, compensation for
shareholders injured by the (gross) negligence of directors would be a good thing. And, at
least in the absence of an exculpation provision in the corporate charter, compensation
remains a possibility. However, the rate of recovery for shareholder-plaintiffs is much too
low to argue that compensation plays a meaningful role in the corporate law duty of care
22 3
paradigm.
In fact, with respect to large public corporations, it would be impossible for
compensation to play a major role. Corporate directors simply do not have the personal
resources that would be needed to provide compensation for the harm that they are capable
of inflicting through their negligence. Director negligence easily can cause billions of
dollars of loss, while directors' wealth is usually measured only in the millions. Moreover,
even in situations where directors could make shareholders whole, it would likely ruin the
few directors in order to provide very small awards to huge numbers of shareholders224
turning the normal tort vision of cost shifting on its head.
Thus, compensation cannot be listed as an argument in favor of the corporate law duty
of care. Deterrence, on the other hand, can and should. Although a liability regime may fall
short with respect to compensation, it nevertheless may have an important deterrent effect.
How deterrence works is not a mystery: if directors have to internalize the
consequences of their (gross) negligence, they are less likely to be (grossly) negligent.
Moreover, that there would be a deterrent effect is not in doubt: the possibility of ruinous
liability would be a huge deterrent. One might be tempted to respond that the duty of care
can't possibly have much of a deterrent effect because there simply isn't much risk of
liability due to the business judgment rule. However, so great is the deterrent effect that it
can even survive the deference of the business judgment rule. Because the potential liability

221.
222.

Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (1742).
For a discussion of the limited role that compensation plays in corporate law, see supra 157-159 and

accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the low rates of recovery, see supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text
224. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 832 & n.34.
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is so great, the expected value of liability can be significant even when the likelihood of
liability is low. Thus, for example, the lone case of Smith v. Van Gorkom22 5 put fear into
226
the hearts of directors everywhere.
In fact, this is what makes the issue so complicated: the deterrent effect is simply too
great. In the case of the corporate law duty of care, the risk of liability over-deters by a
wide margin. Although we want directors merely to avoid negligence, directors are so risk
averse that they would become overly cautious if we held them liable for negligence. They
would not be willing to take on healthy entrepreneurial risks for fear of being secondguessed if things go wrong. 227 Because shareholders do not want timid directors, a liability
regime could be unhelpful.
However, the risk of over-deterrence is not a good reason to abandon the duty of care.
There is a very simple way to deal with the problem while retaining the benefits of
deterrence: underenforcement by means of a deferential standard of review. 228 If enforcing
a negligence standard will lead to overly cautious directors, then enforcing a lesser standard
should be able to lead to the proper degree of care. This is what the business judgment rule
does: it harnesses the deterrent effect of a liability regime to achieve the desired result.
Through underenforcement of the duty of care, risk averse directors are led to act
consistently with the higher standard of conduct-i.e., the enforcement of a gross
negligence standard rather than negligence leads directors to act with ordinary care rather
2 29
than excessive caution.
Admittedly, the argument is more strained in the face of exculpation provisions. When
there is an exculpation provision, there may be no risk of liability at all. In this respect, the
business judgment rule, with its low risk of liability, is superior to an exculpation regime,
with no risk of liability. 230 However, even in a world of ubiquitous and robust exculpation
provisions, an enforceable duty of care may still have a deterrent effect. In the first place,
liability remains an option with respect officers, if not directors. 23 1 While cases against
officers may be extremely rare, they remain a possibility. More significantly, many
scholars believe that directors are deterred by judicial reprimands, regardless of the actual
imposition of liability. 232 If so, the ability to seek such a reprimand, perhaps by way of
declaratory judgment or in an action seeking an injunction, would give the duty of care
some deterrent effect. Finally, it is possible to argue that directors remain liable for at least

225.

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

226.

See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing reaction to the Van Gorkom case).

227. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing diffenng risk profiles of shareholders and
directors); see also Velasco, supranote 4, at 549-50 (discussing how an excessively risk averse corporate director
could negatively impact the entity's returns).
228. See supranotes 35-41, 105-111 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of deferential review);
see also Velasco, supra note 4, at 550-52 (arguing that "protect[ing] directors from honest mistakes on their part

as well as from inevitable mistakes on the part of the legal system

...

empowers directors to pursue the interests

of the corporation and its shareholders to the best of their abilities, without excessive fear of liability").
229. See Velasco, supra note 4, at 551 ("Because imperfect litigation likely would lead to overenforcement

of the standard of review, the result may not be so far from the appropriate level of enforcement for the standard
of conduct.").
230. See supra note 3 (noting author's view that exculpation provisions are sub-optimal).
231. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
232. This is taken up in a later section, as an independent argument in favor of the duty of care. See infra

Part III.E.

2015]

A Defense of the CorporateLaw Duty of Care

some care issues because of the enforceability of the duty of good faith. 233 In extreme
cases, director nonfeasance can exceed the bounds of negligence and become conscious
disregard of duty. 234 In such cases, exculpation is not available to directors. Moreover, as
Disney demonstrates, courts can use such a case to opine on director shortcomings even if
they ultimately do not hold directors liable. 235 Thus, although exculpation provisions may
reduce the deterrent effect of the duty of care, they do not necessarily eliminate it
altogether.
C. The Duty of Loyalty Is Weak
Another reason to maintain the duty of care is based on the weakness of the existing
duty of loyalty-at least, loyalty "as traditionally defined. ' ' 236 If the duty of loyalty were
sufficiently robust, there might be less of a need for the duty of care. 237 Although directors
cannot be trusted when their interests conflict with those of shareholders, perhaps directors
can be trusted when no conflict exists. 238 If the duty of loyalty were able to screen out all
conflicts of interest, then the duty of care might be considered less necessary. The problem
is that the duty of loyalty is not very strong at all. 239 Because it does not adequately screen
out all conflicts of interests, the need for other avenues of enforcement remain.
Long ago, the duty of loyalty was much more robust: conflicts were essentially
prohibited. 240 As Professor Harold Marsh noted long ago, "[i]n 1880 it could have been
stated with confidence that in the United States the general rule was that any contract
between a director and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or
24 1
its shareholders, without regard to the fairness or unfaimess of the transaction."
However, over time, the duty of loyalty was relaxed to allow conflicted transactions under
increasing circumstances. 242 According to Marsh,

233. See infra Part IV.C (discussing relationship between duty of care and duty of good faith).
234. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63-67 (discussing distinction between
negligence and bad faith).
235. See, eg, id at 56 (discussing "best practices" despite not holding directors liable).
236. Id. at 66. In Stone v Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court subsumed the duty of good faith within the
duty of loyalty. As a "doctrinal consequence," it concluded that "the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to
cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest." Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). For present purposes, I am setting aside this aspect of
the duty of loyalty for two reasons. First, it is controversial. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text
(discussing the shortcomings of Stone v. Ritter). Second, the duty of good faith involves intentional misconduct,
rather than mere conflicts, and it is therefore far more difficult to prove a breach of the duty of good faith than
the duty of loyalty (as traditionally defined). See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1248 50 (describing standards of
review for the duty of good faith). The duty of good faith is taken up again in a later section. See infra Part IV.C.
237. Actually, there would still be a need. See infra Part IlI.D.
238. See Velasco, supranote 13, at 834 & n.42.
239. Cf Bainbridge et al., supra note 200, at 568 ("[D]espite the rhetoric of enhanced scrutiny, we find
evidence of the importance that Delaware corporate law places on deference to director decisions, even in cases
implicating loyalty claims "); Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1276 ("Generally speaking, the legal sanctions for
violating the duty of loyalty are inefficiently low.").
240. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The FiduciaryRelationship Its Economic Characterand
Legal Consequences,66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1054 & n.23 (1991) ("Traditionally, a fiduciary was barred strictly
from self-dealing.") (citing cases).
241. Marsh, supranote 192, at 36.
242. See generally id at 36-48.
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[b]y 1960 it could be said with some assurance that the general rule was that no
transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was automatically
voidable at the suit of a shareholder, whether there was a disinterested majority
of the board or not; but that the courts would review such a contract and subject
it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and would invalidate the contract if it was found
24 3
to be unfair to the corporation.
The deterioration of the rigor of the duty of loyalty has continued such that, by now, the
duty of loyalty is only weakly enforced.

On its surface, the duty of loyalty appears to remain strong. Rather than granting the
deference of the business judgment rule, loyalty issues invoke the much more demanding
entire fairness test. 2 4 4 Not only do directors bear the burden of proof, but they must justify
both their decision making process and the substance of their decisions. 2 4 5 And yet, the
246
details paint a different picture.
247
Despite the broad language with which the courts often describe the duty of loyalty,
the entire fairness test is not applied to all director conflicts. It is only applied to those that
"rise to the level of self-dealing." 2 4 8 "Classic examples of [self-dealing] involve either a

director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit
from a transaction not received by the shareholders generally." 2 4 9 Although actual selfdealing is not a prerequisite, many conflicts that might be thought to compromise a
2 50
director's independence, such as friendship, are generally considered insufficient.

Generally, to be cognizable, a conflict must consist of either a personal or familial financial
interest. Even so, not all financial conflicts will be sufficient to invoke the entire fairness
test. The conflict must also be "material. ' 2 5 1 A hypothetical or speculative conflict is
insufficient. 2 52 Furthermore, approval by disinterested directors can sanitize conflicts of

243. ld. at 36-48.
244. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("The entire fairness test essentially requires
'judicial scrutiny."').
245. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (discussing the entire fairness test).
246. See generallv Velasco, supranote 23, at 1242-43 ("[T]he entire fairness test is not quite as demanding
as could be imagined."); Velasco, supra note 13, at 853-54 n. 137 ("It is not clear that the entire fairness test is
quite as strict as judicial statements suggest.").
247. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (using language such as "the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive" to describe the duty of loyalty); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating
that the duty of loyalty is "the most scrupulous observance of... [one's] duty"); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710
(defining the duty of loyalty as "the utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness").
248. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1983)). See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del 1971) ("[The intrinsic
fairness standard] will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing . .
249. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. See also Sinclair,280 A.2d at 720.
250. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) ("Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise
to this level and the Court cannot make a reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without specific
factual allegations to support such a conclusion.").
251. Cede& Co., 634 A.2dat 362-64.
252. Even a director's interest in maintaining his position on the board in the face of a hostile takeover may
not be sufficient. See Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitnn, Inc. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S'holders Litig.), Nos. 13656, 13699,
1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) ("The board's interest in employing these defensive
measures to deflect [a hostile] offer does not rise to the level of a self-dealing transaction that requires the board
to demonstrate entire fairness."); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 n. 1 (Del. Ch.
1988) ("While the recapitalization does represent a transaction in which the 14 person board (and most intensely,
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individual directors 253 -even though structural bias arguably prevents those directors from
being considered reliable arbiters. 254 In fact, a plaintiff generally must show that a majority
25 5
of the directors are conflicted under these forgiving standards.
Once applied, the entire fairness test is no longer considered outcomedeterminative. 2 56 It does not require that a director's conduct be perfect, only that it be
fair. 2 57 In fact, the Delaware Court of Chancery has increasingly taken to speaking of a
"range of fair value." 258 This is a far cry from "the most scrupulous inherent fairness" that
courts used to speak of.259 In fact, the courts have even held that a transaction can be
considered entirely fair in the face of gross negligence 26 0-a holding that may not be
26 1
logically impossible, but is at least troubling.
Clearly, the duty of loyalty as it exists in corporate law is not all that strong. It does
not even purport to capture all conflicts of interest, and does not do a very thorough job on
those it does. Of course, there may be good reasons for limiting the scope of the duty of
loyalty. 262 However, it is important to acknowledge that the scope is very limited.
Recognizing these limits can help to prevent instances of over-claiming.
Even if it is true that unconflicted directors can be trusted, "the fact that a shareholder
cannot establish self-dealing does not mean that directors were not conflicted[.] ' ' 263 There
are conflicts that courts refuse to recognize under the duty of loyalty. Although such
conflicts may not warrant review under the entire fairness test, they do not deserve to be

its seven inside members) has an interest. . it does not represent a self-dealing transaction in the sense necessary
to place upon the board the heavy burden of the intnnsic fairness test.").
253. DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
8 § 144 (2010).
254. See generally Velasco, supra note 13 (discussing directors and structural bias).
255 Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1049; Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996).
256. See Cinerama, Inc. v Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) ("[A]n initial judicial
determination that a given breach of a board's fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the business
judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the board action was entirely fair, and
is, therefore, not outcome-determinative per se."); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("It is
sometimes thought that the decision whether to apply the business judgment rule or the entire fairness test can be
outcome-determinative ....Application of the entire fairness rule does not, however, always implicate liability
of the conflicted corporate decisionmaker, nor does it necessarily render the decision void.").
257. See Cinerama, 663 A 2d at 1179 ("A finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness
analysis."); Weinberger v. UOP, INC., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (stating that "perfection is not possible, or
expected").
258. See, e.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442,465 (Del. Ch. 2011) ("When conducting a
fair price inquiry as par of the entire fairness standard of review, the court asks whether the transaction was one
'that a reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one that
such a seller could reasonably accept."') (quoting Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143).
259. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. While it is undoubtedly true that fair value can be considered to be a
range rather than a point, that is irrelevant There is a minimum point of fairness: anything below itwould be
considered unfair to the shareholders; anything above that would be considered fair, even if it is in fact too
generous. Thus, shifting the rhetoric from "the most scrupulous inherent fairness" to a "range of fairlness]," serves
only one purpose: to water down the standard of review. Courts no longer have to determine whether a given
price is "entirely" fair, but only whether it is in the ballpark.
260. See, e.g., Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1179-80.
261. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 853-54 & n.137. Cf Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1140 ("1 recognize the force
of the claim that a process that is uninformed can never be fair to shareholders.").
262. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 59, at 663-71 (discussing why corporate law grants directors
flexibility, even as to loyalty issues).
263. Velasco, supra note 23, at 1255.
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immunized from further review, either. We might be willing to let negligence-even gross
negligence-slide if we were confident that directors are not conflicted. However, when
we are not so confident, it becomes more important to police at least the worst cases of
negligence.
Thus, an important reason to retain the duty of care is that the duty of loyalty is only
weakly enforced. Defendants who survive scrutiny under the duty of loyalty cannot be said,
with any confidence, to be unconflicted. Therefore, they should not be shielded from
review under the duty of care.
D. The Duty of Loyalty Is Not Enough
Another reason to preserve the duty of care is that the duty of loyalty is simply
insufficient to do the work of policing fiduciary relationships. Once fiduciary duties are
put in the context of fiduciary relationships, it becomes evident that the concept of loyalty,
while certainly important, does not adequately address the issues raised by fiduciary
relationships. The concept of care, or diligence, is also necessary.
What is a fiduciary duty? It is not so much a special type of duty as it is a duty
imposed in a special kind of relationship. A fiduciary relationship is a legally
recognized relationship in which one is given power over the interests of another,
who thereby becomes vulnerable to abuse. Although such relationships are risky,
they can also be very beneficial. In order to encourage and police such
relationships, the law imposes a duty on the first party-the fiduciary-to act in
the interests of the second party-the beneficiary (who is often, but not always,
the entrustor, or the party granting the power to the first). Thus, the raison d'6tre
of fiduciary duties, and of the designation of relationships as fiduciary, is the
protection of the beneficiary from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary.264
Of course, one way in which the fiduciary might abuse the beneficiary is to use his
fiduciary powers to benefit himself rather than the beneficiary. This is clearly prohibited
by the duty of loyalty. However, this is not the only concern in a fiduciary relationship. As
Professor Robert Cooter put it,
[t]he fiduciary relationship exposes a beneficiary/principal to two distinct types
of wrongdoing: first, the fiduciary may misappropriate the principal's asset or
some of its value (an act of malfeasance); and second, the fiduciary may neglect
the asset's management (an act of nonfeasance). Each type of wrongdoing is
controlled by imposing a legal duty upon the fiduciary. The formermisappropriation-is governed by the duty of loyalty, and the latter-negligent
265
mismanagement-is governed by the duty of care.
Loyalty is important. However, it is not necessarily the primary concern in a fiduciary
relationship. Of primary importance is that the fiduciary does a good job-exercising all
their skill with the appropriate diligence. 266 This is the domain of the duty of care, which
264.
265.

Velasco, supra note 171, at 159 (citations omitted).
Cooter & Freedman, supra note 240, at 1047.

266. This argument is based on personal instinct and anecdotal evidence from discussing the issue with
others. People tend to be more concerned with care issues than with loyalty issues when seeking professional
assistance.
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protects beneficiaries from fiduciary shirking. The possibility of a conflict of interests is
very often only a secondary or theoretical concern for the beneficiary.
Of course, there are other considerations that make the duty of care a less pressing
concern than the duty of loyalty, especially in the corporate context. For example, while
care issues may be ubiquitous, conflicts of interest are more significant when they do exist.
Moreover, market forces and competition do a better job at limiting a director's ability to
shirk than at curbing the incentives to engage in self-dealing. 267 So while the duties of care
and loyalty may be equally important as a conceptual matter, they are not equal priorities
as a practical matter. Nevertheless, care concerns should not be discounted.
Moreover, care issues are not so categorically different than loyalty issues. In many
cases, one can be recast as the other. 268 For example, shirking can be considered negligent
behavior, or as a conflict of interest regarding the director's time and energy. In the latter
sense, shirking becomes a form of self-dealing: directors have to decide whether to spend
their time and effort on business matters, for the benefit of shareholders, or reserve it for
personal matters, for their own benefit. 269 Conceptualized in this way, care and loyalty
issues arguably differ in degree rather than kind.
For the courts to interpret care issues in this way would be problematic: it would
undermine some of the basic premises of corporate law and invite the heavy scrutiny of the
entire fairness test in many, if not all, cases. That would be as unwise as it is unlikely.
However, the realization that care issues are not so dissimilar to loyalty issues should give
pause to those who would eliminate of the duty of care.
In short, the duty of loyalty-at least in its current form-is insufficient to police
270
to pick up
fiduciary relationships. The duty of care is necessary, among other reasons,
its slack. Ultimately, fiduciaries must pursue the interests of the beneficiaries, and this
concern extends beyond cognizable loyalty issues.
E. The Expressive Value of Law
A final reason why the duty of care should not be eliminated is because of the
expressive and pedagogical effect of law. 27 1 The law does more than issue penalties for
the violation of its mandates. By telling people what is required of them, the law influences

267.
268.

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
Cf supra note 23 and accompanying text.

269.

See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 240, at 1056 ("[T]he fiduciary who shirks, in effect, appropriates

effort owed to the principal."); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1795 (2007) ("Classic duty of care cases also involve a director taking for

herself something which should otherwise be the corporation's: her attention and diligence.").
270. 1do not mean to suggest that the main purpose of the duty of care is to serve as a backstop for the duty
of loyalty. My argument is only that anotherreason to maintain a meaningful duty of care-in addition to its own
intnnsic value is that we do not have a sufficiently robust duty of loyalty.
271.

See generally Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996)

(explaining the importance of social meaning in the law); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U.CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995) (describing the role of social construction in law); Richard H. MeAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (discussing how social norms

"develop more robust explanations of behavior and. .. predict more accurately the effect of legal rules"); Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (discussing the significance of

expressive content in laws, explaining that laws serve to say who we are as a people as much as they may serve a
deterrence effect).
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personal morality. Thus, for example, people may be more inclined to believe that conduct
is morally acceptable if it is legal and to believe that it is morally unacceptable if it is
illegal. 2 72 Moreover, people often obey the law simply because it is the law. 273 As a result
of these effects, the existence of the duty of care can have the effect of making corporate
managers more diligent. Conversely, the elimination of the duty of care sends the signal
that diligence is not important and could have the effect of making corporate managers less
27 4
diligent.
Many corporate law scholars recognize that the law of fiduciary duties can have a
positive value entirely independent of legal enforcement. 275 An especially popular view is
that judicial opinions can influence director behavior, even without a formal legal sanction,
simply by letting directors know what they might have done differently. 276 In other words,

272. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, An Epistemic Casefor Legal Moralism, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 615,
629 (2010) (noting that citizens may rely on the inference that illegality and immorality are coextensive).
273. See TYLER, supra note 132, at 170 ("People generally feel that existing legal authorities are legitimate,
and this legitimacy promotes compliance with the law."). See also Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1270 ("[T]he
general norm of obedience to law ... is one of the most powerful norms of our society.").
274. See Bruner, supra note 57, at 1053 ("[C]alling the duty of care a 'fiduciary' duty for decades and then
abruptly restyling it as something else might be misinterpreted by the marketplace as a de facto demotionundercutting compliance stemming from motivations other than fear of monetary damages.").
275. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1269 ("[M]any legal rules have an expressive effect-that is, in
addition to their regulatory effects, legal rules send messages of vanous kinds."); Coffee, supra note 17, at 798
("In my view, what is most desirable about the duty of care is its socializing and exhortative impact."); Rock &
Wachter, supranote 73, at 1623 ("The duty of care, despite looking like a typical legally enforceable standard of
care, actually is best understood as an NLERS [i.e., non-legally enforceable rules and standards], with the business
judgment rule assunng that enforcement is almost entirely nonlegal.").
276. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (suggesting judicial opinions essentially put directors on
notice as to what behavior is acceptable); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,
and the Behavioral Foundations of CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2001) ("By articulating a
social expectation that directors will exercise due care, judicial opinions on the duty of care may influence
directors' behavior not so much by changing their external incentives as by changing their internal preferences.");
Hill & McDonnell, supranote 269, at 1794 ("Extralegal forces-norms and reputation-play a very strong role
in the behavior of corporate actors. Delaware courts are clearly aware of this function, and employ it to encourage
behavior they find desirable but that would be difficult to address more directly through law itself."); Coffee,
supra note 17, at 796 (discussing an "important consequence of the judicial dicta that has elaborated on the nature
of the duty: its educational and socializing effect"); Rock, supranote 78, at 1013 ("[T]he Delaware courts provide
a supplemental source of gossip, cnticism, and sanction for this set of actors who are beyond the reach of the
firm's normal systems of social control."); Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1270 ("The clarifying function of legal
rules has obvious relevance to the duty of care, because one function of the cases that clarify the meaning of that
duty, especially in a directorial context, is to tell directors how to play their directorial role .... Having been so
instructed, directors who wanted to perform their role properly made appropriate adjustments in their conduct
not necessarily to avoid liability, but just because they wanted to play their roles properly.").Vanous Delaware
judges have expressed a similar view. See, e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 13, at 1406 ("[A]n opinion
that raises questions or teaches without imposing liability may provide guidance to the corporate world to conform
to best practices without the downside of actually imposing personal liability."); Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret,
Delaware's Guidance" Ensuring Equity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 189, 207 (2007)
("[T]he Delaware judges have frequently crafted dicta to give valuable guidance to deal lawyers on unanswered
questions."); William T. Allen, The CorporateDirector'sFiduciary Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule Under US. CorporateLaw, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 307, 328 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds.,
1998) ("This unclanty [concerning the duty of care and its enforcement] offers the possibility that the legal system
may extract some of the benefits of encouraging director attentiveness, while avoiding the worst elements of the
efficiency costs that actually imposing liability on directors would entail.").
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the courts can help to establish and encourage social norms with which directors will
277

generally comply.
To be fair, there is diversity of opinion on how social norms should operate. Some
scholars, such as Professor Eisenberg, believe that legal forces and extra-legal forces can
work together to achieve compliance with the desired social norms. 278 Others, such as
Professors Rock and Wachter, believe that the legal enforcement ought not to play a role,
at least when it comes to the duty of care. 2 79 Either way, the existence of the duty of care
is necessary to get the benefit of this expressive effect of law.
In fact, an enforceable duty of care is likely to be much more effective in this regard
than an unenforceable duty of care. This is true for two reasons. First, most people obey
the law out of a mixture of different motivations, and fear of punishment is one of those
motives. 280 As previously discussed, the potential for liability for breach of the duty of
care can have a significant deterrent effect. 28 1 This possibility will cause directors to pay
a little more attention to the standards articulated by the courts. 282 A related benefit is that
directors are more likely to believe that other directors are complying with the law, and as
283
a result are more likely to comply themselves.
Second, the courts generally need a potentially-enforceable duty of care in order to
articulate standards of conduct. Consider Rock's account of how the corporate law of
fiduciary duties is developed:
[T]he Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct
(which influence the development of the social norms of directors, officers, and
lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as "corporate law sermons."
These richly detailed and judgmental factual recitations, combined with
explicitly judgmental conclusions, sometimes impose legal sanctions but
surprisingly often do not. Taken as a whole, the Delaware opinions can be
understood as providing a set of parables-instructive tales-of good managers
and bad managers, of good lawyers and bad lawyers, that, in combination, fill
out the normative job description of these critical players. My intuition is that we
277.

See, eg., Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1265 ("The level of directorial care is largely driven by. social

norms, rather than by the threat of liability or the prospect of gain "); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive
Compensationandthe Optimal Penumbraof Delaware CorporationLaw, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 333,363 (2009)
("[T]hat is what people often do: they follow norms."); Rock, supra note 78, at 1013 ("[A]I1 of us internalize rules

and standards of conduct with which we generally try to comply.").
278.
279.

See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 1269. See also Hill & McDonnell, supra note 276, at 360.
See Rock & Wachter, supra note 73, at 1685.

280. See TYLER, supra note 132, at 3-5 (discussing four factors that motivate people to obey the law).
281. See supra Part II.B.
282. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 277, at 362 ("By engaging in the kind of best practices praised by
Delaware judges, even though doing so is not required, officers and directors reduce to nearly zero the already
extremely small chances of legal liability."); Rock, supra note 78, at 1103 ("[T]he 'thick-skinned' businessman
[who] wants to skate close to the edge . .will . . . [probably not] be constrained by the possibility that he will go
down in history as a villain of Delaware corporate law .... But his lawyer is likely to advise him that such
behavior will make it more likely that the deal will be enjoined, or that he will be left unprotected against
maneuvers by his opponents.").
283. See STOUT, supra note 132, at 99 ("[U]nselfish compliance with legal and ethical rules.., is triggered
by social context, including ... belief about others' prosocial behavior... "). Cf Eisenberg, supranote 81, at

1270 ("[T]he adoption of a legal rule, even without formal enforcement, can cause actors to correctly believe that
there will be more social enforcement of the norm.").
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come much closer to understanding the role of courts in corporate law if we think
284
ofjudges more as preachers than as policemen.
This model does not require legal enforcement to function. Nevertheless, it does require
legal enforceability. If a standard is entirely unenforceable, then shareholders will be
unable to bring it before the court. Without any occasion to opine on the standard, the
courts will be unable to deliver their "sermons." Without those sermons, standards cannot
be articulated and social norms cannot be influenced. Thus, the duty of care must be
285
enforceable, even if only barely, in order for this expressive effect to work.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the purpose of the duty of care is to facilitate
sermonizing by the courts. In my opinion, "[i]t
is... the province and duty of the [judiciary]
to say what the law is," 2 86 not to give sermons. Courts are legal experts, not moral experts.
They have no special authority to demand that litigants and other affected people go above
and beyond the requirements of the law. Thus, there is something objectionable to Rock's
view ofjudges as more "preachers" than "policeman"-at least to the extent that one views
the law as comprising the standard of review, and standards of conduct as mere aspirational
fluff.287 What I mean to defend is the practice of judicial articulation of what the law
requires of directors and other fiduciaries, regardless of whether those requirements will
be enforceable by monetary damages. The difference between sermonizing and opining, as
I see it, is that a sermon tells someone what they morally ought to do (but legally need not
do), while an opinion tells them what they legally must do (even if the consequences will
be limited). It is the expressive value of the law itself that matters, not the expressive value
of the judiciary.
Of course, the expressive value of the law is a double-edged sword in corporate law.
Given the lack of legal enforceability, one could easily perceive the law to be expressing
ambivalence at best, and lack of concern at worst, with respect to the duty of care. 288 This
is a legitimate concern, and one that would support greater enforcement, but it is a concern
that is outweighed by the justifications for the business judgment rule. The solution is to
have the courts clearly articulate the reasons for the underenforcement of the duty of care.
If a court suggests that a negligent director should have done better but did not breach his
duty of care (because he was not grossly negligent)-as the court seemed to do in
Disney289 -it is, at best, sermonizing. This is unlikely to have the intended effect because
directors could just as easily read such an opinion to be saying that they need not worry
about the duty of care because it is very difficult to breach. On the other hand, a court could
conclude that a negligent director breached his fiduciary duty but, under the business
judgment rule, would not be held liable because the plaintiff could not establish gross

284. Rock, supranote 78, at 1016.
285. As I suggest later in this Article, care-type issues survive under the auspices of the duty of good faith.
See infra Part V.C. Thus, even without an enforceable duty of care, it is possible for the courts to sermonize (or
opine) on issues ofdirector diligence-as they did in Disney. However, it is doubtful whether one could get good
opinions on negligence issues when the issue being litigated is limited to intentional misconduct.
286. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
287. See Velasco, supra note 4, at 524-38 (describing "aspirational view" of fiduciary duties).
288. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (offering alternative interpretations ofjudicial deference).
289. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del. 2006) ("Even though the
Chancellor found much to criticize in Eisner's 'imperial CEO' style of governance, . . . in the end, Eisner's
conduct satisfied the standards required of him as a fiduciary.").
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negligence. This sends a clearer message that the duty of care was breached and is more
likely to have the effect of causing directors to pay attention. The difference may seem
slight, but it is potentially of great significance. In the first example, it is clear that the
directors have done nothing wrong as a legal matter, but that the court would prefer for
them to strive to do better. In the second example, it is clear that the directors have breached
their duties, and that they are not being held liable for other reasons. The desire to comply
with the law would become a motivating factor in the latter instance, and not in the former.
In short, the duty of care should be maintained because of the expressive effects of
the law. Even without regard to actual legal enforcement, the existence of a duty of care
can lead to enhanced director diligence. However, minimal enforceability seems to be
necessary to capitalize on this benefit.
IV. WHY IT MATTERS

The goal of this Article is to provide a defense of the fiduciary duty of care as it
currently exists in corporate law: a fiduciary duty that is demanding in principle but
deliberately underenforced by the courts. In Part II, I considered various arguments
commonly raised against the duty of care. I sought to establish that, although the arguments
generally support the claim that the duty of care ought not to be enforced rigorously, they
do not support the claim that the duty of care should be eliminated. In Part III, I considered
various arguments that can be raised in favor of the duty of care. I sought to establish' that
there are many good reasons for retaining an underenforced duty of care.
I now consider why the issue matters. If there are good arguments for and against the
duty of care and the question is whether it should be enforced lightly or eliminated
altogether, the stakes may not seem to be very high. However, this appearance is deceptive.
The question of whether we retain or eliminate a modest duty of care goes to the heart of
fiduciary principles in corporate law. It serves as a proxy for the larger question of whether
we should see fiduciary duties as providing a secure foundation for a meaningful fiduciary
relationship or merely as another set of technical requirements that managers must
navigate.
In this Part, I will argue the former position. First, I will show that the fiduciary
principle is broad and expansive, and cannot be boiled down to a few simple rules. Then I
will argue that the urge to simplify the law of fiduciary duties is misguided. Finally, I will
suggest that, in the long run, the courts will tend to resist the reductionist impulse to
simplify at the expense of equity. Thus, it is better to accept the duty of care and deal with
it directly than to attempt to eliminate it and invite judicial innovation.
A. FiduciaryPrinciplesAre Inherently Broad
What are the basic principles of fiduciary law? This is a controversial question.
Scholars do not agree on the source of fiduciary law, and many are skeptical about whether
fiduciary law can be adequately defined. 290 Nevertheless, there is agreement on at least the
most basic principles of fiduciary law. "At its core, a fiduciary relationship is one in which
one party-the fiduciary-is trusted with power over the interests of another-the

290.

See Velasco, supra note 171, at 160 (discussing scholarly debate).
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Because of the vulnerability inherent

in a fiduciary relationship, trust becomes an important concept in fiduciary law. "[T]he
essence of a fiduciary relationship is the legal expectation that the fiduciary will adopt the
other-regarding preference function that is the hallmark of trustworthy behavior." 292 To
facilitate trust, the law imposes upon the fiduciary a special obligation to act in the interests
of the beneficiary. The exact nature of this special obligation varies upon the
circumstances. In corporate law, there seems to be a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and
some sort of duty of good faith. 293 However, as Professors Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell
have argued, fiduciary duties can be understood at different levels of abstraction. 294 At the
highest level of abstraction, there is only one fiduciary duty: a duty to pursue the interests
of the beneficiary. 295 This view most clearly reveals the true nature of fiduciary duties.
The duties of care, loyalty, and good faith are simply manifestations of this one duty at
lower levels of abstraction: the duty of care represents the duty to pursue the interests of
the beneficiary carefully; the duty of loyalty represents the duty to pursue the interests of
the beneficiary loyally; and the duty of good faith represents the duty to pursue the interests
of the beneficiary honestly.296 "Both generally and in each case, the purpose of fiduciary
297
duties is to protect beneficiaries from abuse at the hands of the fiduciary."
Properly understood, fiduciary duty is a pervasive concept. Enforcement issues aside,
the courts agree. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, "fiduciary duty does not
operate intermittently but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the
corporation ...must be guided."' 2 98 The court has often described the directors' fiduciary

291.
Id.at 161. See also TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011) ("[T]he definitions of fiduciaries...
share three main elements: (1) entrustment of property or power, (2) entrustors' trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk
to the entrustors emanating from the entrustment."); DeMott, supranote 149, at 936 ("The defining or determining
criterion should be whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in
expecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether the actor's conduct contravened that expectation.");
Smith, supranote 160, at 1402 ("[F]iduciary relationships form when one party. . acts on behalf of another party
...while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the [other]."); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE
LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 35 (1981) ("A fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any
type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilize that power in the best interests of another[.]"); Paul
B. Miller, Justifying FiduciaryDuties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 1011 ("A fiduciary relationship is one in which one
party... exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another[.]").
292. Blair & Stout, supra note 276, at 1743.
293. See Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (discussing the "triads of.
fiduciary duty"); Stone ex rel AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (demoting duty
of good faith to subset of loyalty). In other work, I have also argued that Delaware law can be interpreted to
provide for two additional duties: a duty of objectivity, covering situations involving structural bias and reviewed
for reasonableness, and a duty of rationality, covering the substance of business decisions and reviewed for waste.
See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1235.
294. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 269, at 1788-89.
295. See id. at 1788 ("At the very highest level, there is just one fiduciary duty-to pursue faithfully and
diligently the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."). See also Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty's
Core Demand- The Defining Role of Good Faith in CorporationLaw, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 635 (2010) ("[lit is
possible to conceive of there being only one core duty[.]"), Velasco, supranote 23, at 1281-84 (discussing "one
fundamental fiduciary duty").
296. See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1301.
297. Velasco, supra note 171, at 163.
298. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
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duty as "unremitting." 2 99 Moreover, fiduciary duty also extends beyond negative
prescription and includes an affirmative component. 300 This was eloquently described long
ago, in the seminal case of Guth v. Loft:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests
of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to
30 1
make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.
This, of course, is entirely sensible. It is responsive to the nature of the fiduciary relation.
A beneficiary needs a fiduciary who is pursuing the beneficiary's interests-actively,
honestly, at all times, and in all respects relevant to the relationship. Anything less would
undermine the trust that is the foundation of the fiduciary relationship. Therefore, this is
302
what the law demands of fiduciaries.
This claim may seem excessive in light of the limited nature of judicial enforcement
of fiduciary duties generally and the duty of care in particular. However, the claim is made
advisedly. This is what the law demands of fiduciaries. What the courts will enforce is a
separate matter. 30 3 Enforcement is an issue that involves many practical considerations.
Some of those considerations may be general enough to affect all of fiduciary law; others
are unique to the corporate law context. For the various reasons discussed throughout this
Article, corporate law has settled upon deferential review. But this decision does not affect
the underlying principles that animate fiduciary law.
Fiduciary duty is a broad concept that encompasses all of the individual fiduciary
duties. Thus, the duty of care is not a separate duty, unrelated to loyalty, that can easily be
eliminated. To the contrary, it is intimately related to the duty of loyalty: different in many
respects, but also fundamentally similar. Care and loyalty could be thought of as siblings:
each unique and yet both part of the same immediate family. Their true relationship,
however, is even closer than that analogy suggests. Care and loyalty-and good faith, as
well as any other fiduciary duties-are different manifestations of the one fiduciary duty.
Therefore, the duty of care cannot be eliminated without doing violence to the framework
of fiduciary duties (and, ultimately, to the duty of loyalty). It would be incoherent to
maintain that fiduciary duty requires directors to pursue the interests of the corporation and

299. See, eg., id.; Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003); Quicktum Design
Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998).

300. See Strine et al,
supra note 295, at 635 ("[W]e think it uncontroversial that the corporate law duty of
loyalty has an affirmative aspect, which demands that a fiduciary make a good faith effort to advance the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders.").
301.

Guth v Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1262-63 (discussing how

302.

Cf Miller, supra note 172, at 75 ("Fiduciary duties constrain the conduct of the fiduciary within the

"most of the passage [quoted above] actually deals with fiduciary duties generally, rather than the duty of loyalty
specifically").
ambit of the relationship so ascertained, but not beyond it.").
303.

See generally Velasco, supra note 4, at 571-80 (discussing "[lt]he viability of the unenforced

requirement").
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its shareholders in all relevant respects except diligence. Diligence is highly relevant, and
to deny the duty of care is to deny that fiduciary duty is pervasive.
B. Oversimplification
As a matter of positive law, there is a corporate law duty of care. 30 4 However, the
duty is enforced weakly, at best. For the most part, directors face almost no risk of personal
liability for breach of the duty of care. Why, then, is there any interest in eliminating the
pressing need: 30 5 at the present time, there is no crisis as
duty? It is not because of any
30 6
there once may have been.

A recurring theme among scholars who write in corporate law is the desire to simplify.
There are many who believe that the law of fiduciary duties has continuously grown to the
point where it has become too complex. 30 7 According to this view, the law needs
significant pruning. 30 8 While this attitude is usually directed towards intermediate
30 9
standards of review, some consider the duty of care to be a doctrine that is expendable.
There is a similar sense among some scholars writing about fiduciary law generally.
Among some, there is a willingness to declassify the duty of care as fiduciary and limit
fiduciary duty to a prohibition against conflicts of interest. 3 10 I reject these views for three

reasons.
First, the law of corporate fiduciary duties is not overly complex. 3 11 Corporate
officers and directors are sophisticated people who generally also have access to legal
advice. If they can manage multibillion-dollar transactions and corporate reorganizations,
they likely canjuggle a handful of fiduciary duties. At the very least, they can handle more
than just one-and while the loyalty may be first on the list of fiduciary duties, care would
be second. Moreover, if corporate managers cannot handle more than one fiduciary duty,
they need only keep in mind the one fundamental duty to pursue the interests of the
shareholders. In short, the problem of complexity is more imagined than real.
Second, the complexity that exists is both inevitable and, to some extent, actually
desirable to management. As previously discussed, the law of fiduciary duties is standards-

304. See supra Part Ill.A (discussing pedigree of the corporate law duty of care).
305. See Bruner, supra note 57, at 1029 ("1 ultimately concede that there may be no pressing imperative to
restyle the duty of care in nonfiduciary terms moving forward-and that there may in fact be good reasons not to

do so[.]").
306. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1291-95 (discussing "protean growth in ... judicial standards
of review"); Bruner, supranote 57, at 1031 ("Delaware's doctrinal structure... has, since the 1980s, continually
grown by accretion, piling complexity upon complexity[.]") See also Velasco, supra note 13, at 845
("intermediate standards [of review] . . multipl[ied] rather than coalesce[d]").
308. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 15, at 864-65 (undertaking "a rigorous functional evaluation of
existing corporate law standards of review" in order to "clarify their application, reduce their number, and
facilitate the task of corporate advisors and courts").
309. See Scott, supranote 5 and accompanying text. Cf Bruner, supranote 57, passim (questioning whether
duty of care should be considered a fiduciary duty).
310. See., e g, CONAGLEN, supra note 160, at 39 ("[D]uties of care are not peculiar to fiduciaries and so do
not merit consideration as 'fiduciary' duties."); Miller, supranote 291, at 976 ("It is ... unclear whether the duty
of care. . . is a fiduciary duty.").

311. See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1293 ("There is no great need for simplification.., because the numbers
at issue are relatively small ... and certainly not beyond the ability of practicing attorneys and sitting judges.").
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based, rather than rules-based. 3 12 However, as the law of fiduciary duties develops in a
common-law process, general principles get applied to particular circumstances and the
3 13
The process is inevitable: even if
standards start to take on the characteristics of rules.
the courts were to recalibrate, it would eventually recur. Moreover, corporate managers
actually welcome this. 3 14 Although there are many advantages to standards, they are by
nature indeterminate and therefore somewhat risky. Corporate managers prefer the
certainty of rules. 3 15 Whatever the standard may be, those who are subject to it will often
want it concretized into specific rules. 3 16 Thus, attempting to get rid of the accretion of
rules is somewhat futile.
Finally, although simplicity has its value, it should not come at the expense of the
substantive law and the values it represents. What is needed is the level of complexity that
3 17
It might make sense to simplify highly technical
is appropriate to the subject matter.
rules of conduct that were intended to implement general standards, but it is less defensible
to eliminate the underlying standards altogether. Thus, eliminating of the duty of care itself,
and possibly reducing fiduciary duty to a rule against self-dealing, goes too far.
Properly understood, fiduciary duties cannot be simplified by eliminating the duty3 of
18
care. Fiduciary law requires directors to pursue the interests of shareholders thoroughly.
The duty of care merely requires them to do so with diligence. Diligence is one of the most
fundamental components of that duty, and one of the qualities that beneficiaries want most
out of their fiduciaries. 3 19 Thus, it would be impossible to eliminate the duty of care and
retain the broad conception of fiduciary duty. Doing so would not be a simplification of
the law, but an oversimplification. It would amount to a reconceptualization of the fiduciary
relationship.
C. Doomed to Failure
I have argued that fiduciary duty is a broad concept that necessarily encompasses the
duty of care, and that the elimination of the duty of care would amount to a reductionist
312. See supra Part 1I.C.1.
313. See Rock, supra note 78, at 1017 ("[D]espite the fact-specific, narrative quality of Delaware opinions,
over time they yield reasonably determinate guidelines."). But compare id at 1015 ("[T]he Delaware courts fill
out the concept of 'good faith' through fact-intensive, normatively saturated descriptions of manager, director,
and lawyer conduct, and of process-descriptions that are not reducible to rules[.]").
314. Cf Steele & Verret, supra note 276, at 209-10 ("[B]oards and deal lawyers ... hope to structure
negotiated deals that are advantageous to parties involved without running afoul of their fiduciary duties, yet face
overwhelming uncertainty of the line that divides measures protected by the business judgment rule from those
that violate fiduciary duties ").
315. Of course, what they really want is the right rule. But, ceteris paribus, a rule might be preferable to a
standard.
316. Cf Rock, supra note 78, at 1014 ("There is a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware
corporate law largely involves standards, but then to try to reduce it to a set of rules.").
317. Cf Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 13, at 1413 ("Fiduciary law is based on equitable principles.
Thus, it is both inherently and usefully indeterminate, because it allows business practices and expectations to
evolve, and enables courts to review compliance with those evolving practices and expectations."); Allen et al.,
supranote 15, 1294 ("Given the blunt nature of the fiduciary doctrine tool, judges must instead describe fiduciary
duties in general terms that can (it is hoped) be sensibly and fairly applied in future diverse circumstances in
which directors are called upon to act.").
318. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (discussing pervasiveness of the duty of care).
319. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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oversimplification of the law. As my final claim, I submit that the urge to simplify-or
oversimplify-fiduciary duties is ultimately doomed to failure. In the long run, courts
sitting in equity, as the Delaware courts do, will be unable or unwilling to permit directors
to ignore their fiduciary duties, broadly understood.
I start with the observation that courts like to develop tests that allow them a great
deal of flexibility. This flexibility is perhaps most evident in standards such as the entire
fairness test and enhanced scrutiny. 320 However, my point is better illustrated by reference
to the waste test. 321 The business judgment rule stands for the proposition that the courts
will not review the substantive merits of business decisions. 322 In Brehm v. Eisner,323 the
Delaware Supreme Court made a very forceful statement to that effect:
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise "substantive
due care," we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment
rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not
even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking
324
context is process due care only.
Scholars tend to agree that courts should not review the substance of business decisions
absent some other breach of fiduciary duty. 325 This policy is so strong that many consider
the business judgment rule to be a policy of non-review, rather than a standard of review. 326
As a standard of review, the waste test has been called "a theoretical exception," because
it "has resulted in no awards of money damages against corporate officers or directors in
Delaware[.]- 327 Nevertheless, courts seem to be unable to do away with the waste test. 328
Even as courts opine on the strength of the business judgment rule, they generally reserve
the right to review the substance of business decisions. Thus, for example, the passage from
Brehm v. Eisner quoted above continues as follows: "Irrationality is the outer limit of the
business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or
it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient
32 9
of the business judgment rule."
It stands to reason that, if the courts cannot let go of review for substance, they will
be even more hesitant concerning the decision-making process.
However, my claim does not rely on this intuition. The fact is that we have seen
something that very closely resembles what I suggest can happen. I am speaking of the
virtual elimination of the duty of care by the legislature and its subsequent revival by the

320. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing entire fairness test); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-57 (Del. 1985) (establishing enhanced scrutiny). Other notable
examples would include the tests for piercing the corporate veil and corporate opportunities.
321. See generally I BLOCK ET AL., supra note 6, at 84-90, 93-97 (discussing the waste test); see also
Velasco, supranote 23, at 1252-56 (same).
322. See supra notes 26-27, 96-97 and accompanying text.
323. Brehm v.Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
324. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (emphasis in the onginal); see supranote 74 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
326. See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
327. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996) See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
328. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
329. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264.
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courts.
Consider the following narrative: In Smith v. Van Gorkom,3 30 the Delaware Supreme
Court sought to breathe life into the duty of care. Apparently, it went too far, because
legislatures responded by allowing the adoption of exculpation provisions. 331 Allowing the
elimination of damages for duty of care claims eviscerated the duty of care. Rather than
being rare but theoretically possible, damages for breach of the duty of care became
impossible. However, this situation would not last forever. Over time, the specter of the
Van Gorkom decision receded, and the need for a duty of care grew. At the continual
prodding of shareholder plaintiffs, the Delaware courts eventually relented and allowed
332
duty of care claims to be recast as duty of good faith claims in Disney and Stone v. Ritter.
The significance of this development cannot be overstated: because good faith claims
cannot be exculpated, damages based on carelessness became a possibility once more.
Of course, the Delaware courts would not agree with the foregoing narrative. They
insist that gross negligence, which would be enough to establish a duty of care violation,
is insufficient to establish a good faith violation. 333 Thus, the legislative decision to allow
exculpation for care claims but not for good faith claims has been respected. 334 However,
that response is not entirely satisfying.
The standard of review for duty of care claims was never entirely clear. It has been
articulated in many different ways over the years. 3 35 It was only in 1984 that the Delaware
Supreme Court settled upon the formulation of gross negligence. 336 Even so, the term gross
negligence has been interpreted in many different ways. Some have interpreted it as
synonymous with recklessness. 337 Thus, when the Delaware Supreme Court held that
conscious disregard of one's duties, or recklessness, would be sufficient to establish a
violation of the duty of good faith, it was arguably restoring Delaware law to (one plausible
interpretation of) the pre-exculpation business judgment rule.
This view is buttressed by the Delaware Supreme Court's reliance on the Caremark
opinion. 338 Although the Stone opinion interpreted Caremarkas involving the duty of good

330. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
331. See supranotes 19-20 and accompanying text.
332. In re the Walt Disney Company Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (2006); Stone v. Ritter 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006).
333. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65
334. See id. ("[A] corporation can exculpate its directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of
care, but not for conduct that is not in good faith. To adopt a definition of bad faith that would cause a violation
of the duty of care automatically to become an act or omission 'not in good faith,' would eviscerate the protections
accorded to directors by the General Assembly's adoption of Section 102(b)(7).").
335. See, e.g., I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.0 1(c) (2005) (stating the requirements for making a business judgment in good faith); 2
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31, official cmt., at 8-197 (2002) ("In basic principle, a board of directors enjoys a
presumption of sound business judgment and its decisions will not be disturbed (by a court substtuting its own
notions of what is or is not sound business judgment) if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose.")
(citation omitted). For additional formulations, see I KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 42, § 2.01, at 2-1 to -5
(providing various conceptions of the business judgment rule standard).
336. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[U]nder the business judgment rule director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.").
337 See, e.g, Allen et al., supranote 15, at 1300 ("[G]ross negligence.., involves a devil-may-care attitude
or indifference to duty amounting to recklessness.").
338. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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faith, the case was clearly a duty of care case: "even the most cursory reading of Caremark
demonstrates that Allen viewed oversight liability as a species of the duty of care . . .- 339
The case was decided as a care case, and the issue involved-monitoring-is a care issue.
Indeed, at the time Caremarkwas decided, good faith was barely even on the judicial radar.
Thus, the Stone court not only converted monitoring into a good faith issue, it also took the
Caremark standard, which was intended as a duty of care standard 34 0-an application of
the business judgment rule, as Chancellor Allen saw it341-and repurposed it as the
standard for good faith.
342
When viewed in this light, the developments in Stone seem downright illegitimate.
Although the legislature had decided that care issues should be entirely exculpable, the
Supreme Court decided that they could lead to liability after all. As a result, the attempt to
eliminate the duty of care had ultimately failed.
I do not mean to suggest that the foregoing account is the correct way to interpret the
events in Stone. The opinion can legitimately be understood to address the independent and
non-exculpable issues of good faith and intentional misconduct. 343 Nevertheless, the
narrative remains compelling. It suggests that attempts to restrict fiduciary duties may be
doomed to failure.
Two final points are worth making. First, the Delaware courts' current understanding
of the duty of good faith makes the status of the duty of care less important as a practical
matter. Apparently, care-type issues survive in the guise of good faith. Second, care-type
claims are not necessarily dependent upon the duty of good faith. The Stone court
announced a broad conception of the duty of loyalty. 344 Similarly, Chief Justice Strine has
forcefully advocated for a broad interpretation of the concept of loyalty. 345 Given that the
concepts of care and loyalty are not as distinct as they may at first appear, 346 it would not
be fanciful to imagine that the court could find other ways to inject care-type issues into
the capacious duty of loyalty. The most obvious way would be to declare shirking to be a
34 7
form of self-dealing.
All of this is unfortunate. It does very little to simplify the law. To the contrary, it
conflates the law and does so in ways that can seem illegitimate. Thus, the courts should
339. Bainbndge et al., supranote 200, at 595-96.
340. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968 ("[Tlhe core element of any corporate law duty of inquiry ... [is]
whether there was good faith effort to be informed and exercise judgment.").
341. See id. at 967-68 ("[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for
all goodfaith board decisions."); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("1 start

with what I take to be an elementary precept of corporation law: in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or
improper motive, acorporate officer or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that may
be suffered as a result of adecision that an officer made or that directors authorized in good faith.").
342. See Velasco, supra note 23, at 1304 ("[T]he court converted a duty of care claim, which the legislature
had determined should be exculpable, into aduty of loyalty issue, which is not.").
343. See id. at 1304 ("Ifthe failure to monitor reflects intentional misconduct, however, it also violates a
duty of good faith and is not exculpable "). This view depends upon the premise that the view that gross negligence
amounts to recklessness issimply wrong.
344. See Stone v. Riltter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) ("[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to
cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the
fiduciary fails to act in good faith.").
345 See generally Strine et. al, supranote 295.
346.

See supra notes 268-269 and accompanying text.

347. See id.
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avoid the urge to (over-)simplify the law of fiduciary duties and instead just try to get it
right.
A broad understanding of fiduciary duty allows for the existence of multiple, but welldefined, fiduciary duties. Care would deal with diligence issues and would be afforded a
great deal of (but not unlimited) deference. Loyalty would be confined to conflicts of
interest, as it traditionally has been, and would be scrutinized closely. And good faith would
be limited to those rare cases that involve intentional misconduct. 348 This is a much simpler
model than the alternative provided by Stone, where one can never be sure what is required
by the capacious duty of loyalty. More importantly, it is a solid and stable model that
respects the purpose of fiduciary duties in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have set forth a comprehensive defense of the fiduciary duty of care
in corporate law. I have considered various arguments against the duty of care, as well as
those in favor. With respect to the former, I concluded that the arguments support reduced
enforcement of the duty of care, but not its elimination. With respect to the latter, I
concluded that there are legitimate and important reasons to have a duty of care. Corporate
law respects both sets of concerns by maintaining a duty of care that is deliberately
underenforced, but not entirely unenforceable. I closed with an explanation of the wisdom
and importance of this result.
My ultimate goal in writing this Article has been to create space for a meaningful duty
of care in corporate law. The value of the duty of care need not come from strict legal
enforcement-a fact that corporate law has long realized. However, the lack of
enforcement should not render the duty of care meaningless, and it certainly does not render
it unnecessary. Corporate law and fiduciary law both need the duty of care. They need
fiduciaries to pursue the interests of the beneficiaries in all relevant respects, including with
diligence. Thus, corporate law must tell managers that this is what the law requires and
demands of them.

348 In other work, I have argued that there are other fiduciary duties as well. See generally Velasco, supra
note 23 (adding objectivity and rationality to care, loyalty, and good faith).

